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THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESPONSE TO IMMIGRATION 
RESTRICTIONISM IN ARGENTINA 
DAVID C. BALUARTE* 
ABSTRACT 
Within days of President Donald Trump’s 2017 Executive Orders on 
border security and immigration enforcement, President Mauricio Macri 
of Argentina issued a Decree to address what he declared was an urgent 
problem of immigrant criminality. The timing of the two Presidents’ 
actions triggered concerns that U.S.-style restrictionist immigration 
regulation was spreading to South America, a continent that has taken 
progressive steps towards recognizing the human rights of migrants in 
recent years. Until Macri’s 2017 Decree, Argentina was considered a 
leader in this regard, with its 2004 immigration law that boldly codified a 
“right to migrate” and included robust substantive and procedural 
protections for immigrants. While the Decree marked the end of an era of 
progressive immigration policy in Argentina, the persistence of 
international human rights protections for migrants could provide the 
means to uphold key aspects of the right to migrate. This Article tracks 
jurisprudential developments under the 2004 law, and then demonstrates 
how the 2017 Decree undermined many of the advances achieved under 
the prior legislative framework. The Article also provides an overview of 
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current litigation to defend the immigrant bill of rights and key procedural 
and judicial protections. The Article argues that the application of 
international human rights law on migration could fend off some of the 
more pernicious features of the 2017 Decree in Argentina. The Article 
concludes that the right to migrate in Argentina has been weakened, but 
that its essence will persist if the Argentine judiciary reinforces human 
rights protections for migrants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2017, President Mauricio Marci of Argentina issued a Decree 
to toughen immigration regulation in response to what his administration 
articulated as an urgent problem of criminality among immigrants.1 This 
action was instantly compared to the executive orders issued just days 
earlier by United States President Donald J. Trump.2 The similarity in the 
rhetoric each President used to justify his actions drew the attention of the 
Argentine public and officials throughout Latin America.3 This is in part 
because Argentina had made great strides over more than a decade to forge 
a reputation as a model for progressive immigration policy, in stark 
contrast to the United States, which has responded to immigration with 
increasingly harsh deportation and detention practices during the same 
period.4 Indeed, the Argentine legislature enacted a progressive 
immigration law in 2004, and in it established a “right to migrate,” which 
many have suggested lays the conceptual foundation for understanding 
migration as a human right.5  
Argentina’s cutting-edge Law 25.871 of 2004 (“the 2004 Law”) was 
enacted against the backdrop of a troubled history of immigration 
regulation. The law in effect prior to the enactment of the 2004 Law was a 
dictate of the military junta that ruled Argentina from 1976-83.6 The 
Videla Law, as it was known, provided the National Department of 
 
 
1  Decreto 70/2017, Modifying Law No. 25.871, Jan. 27, 2017, [33555] B.O. 1 [hereinafter 
DNU] (translation by author). 
2  Simon Romero & Daniel Politi, Argentina’s Trump-Like Immigration Order Rattles South 
America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/americas/argentinas-trump-like-immigration-order-
rattles-south-america.html. 
3  See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, § 1 (Jan. 25, 2017) (stating that “[a]mong those who illegally enter are 
those who seek to harm Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct. Continued illegal 
immigration presents a clear and present danger to the interests of the United States.”); see also 
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8799, § 1 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“Tens of thousands of removable aliens have been released into 
communities across the country . . . . The presence of such individuals in the United States . . . [is] 
contrary to the national interest.”). 
4  Marisa Franco & Carlos Garcia, The Deportation Machine Obama Built for President 
Trump, THE NATION (June 27, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-deportation-machine-
obama-built-for-president-trump/. 
5  Barbara Hines, The Right to Migrate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration 
Law, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 471 (2010); Lila García, Migraciones, Estado y una política del derecho 
humano a migrar: ¿hacia una nueva era en América Latina?, 88 COLOMBIA INTERNACIONAL 107, 
109-10, 112 ( 2016). 
6  Ley General de Migraciones y Fomento de la Inmigración, Law No. 22439, Mar. 23, 1981, 
[24637] B.O. 6. 
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Migration (in Spanish, “DNM”) with largely unreviewable powers to 
manage the task of immigration enforcement as it deemed appropriate.7 A 
decade later, in unmistakable reaction to the authoritarian government that 
had taken nearly thirty thousand civilian lives in the name of public order, 
Argentina had passed the 1994 Constitution, which placed core 
international human rights treaties on par with the constitution itself.8 
While that same constitution established that non-citizens have the same 
civil rights as citizens,9 human rights did not permeate the sphere of 
immigration law until the legislature promulgated Law 25.871.10 The 2004 
Law, passed with the overwhelming support of lawmakers at the time,11 
established a right to migrate, and included a range of legal protections 
and policy objectives in furtherance of immigrant rights and the human 
dignity of migrants.12 
In order to advance immigrant rights, the 2004 Law established robust 
substantive and procedural protections for migrants seeking lawful status 
to remain in Argentina. First, it includes a bill of rights that reinforces the 
notion of equal rights between non-citizens and citizens established under 
the 1994 Constitution, provides expansive social and economic rights 
guarantees, and promotes family unity through a variety of provisions.13 
The bill of rights further includes the novel concept of a right to migrate, 
puts the burden on the State to provide irregular migrants with public 
assistance to regularize their situation, and mandates the development of 
regularization programs.14 Second, the law codified robust procedural 
guarantees, which included multiple levels of appeal of adverse decisions, 
free legal assistance for immigrants in expulsion proceedings at the 
 
 
7  Barbara Hines, An Overview of Argentine Immigration Law, 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
395, 405-06 (1999). Hines recalls that, under the Videla Law, there were no regulations governing the 
“initiation of expulsion proceedings, bond, burden of proof, or the conduct of the hearing.” Id. at 405. 
There were no immigration courts or independent judges, and thus, the “majority of cases [were] 
resolved without formal hearings, bond, or appeals.” Id. The lack of direct judicial review of a 
negative decision provided the Immigration Department with largely unreviewable authority. A party 
seeking to appeal a negative decision was able only to proceed by means of a “constitutional amparo, 
or habeas corpus.” Id. at 406. 
8  Art. 75.22, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] (Arg.). 
9  Id. art. 20. 
10  Hines, supra note 5, at 482-84. 
11  Susana Novick, Migración y políticas en Argentina: Tres leyes para un país extenso (1876-
2004), at 142-43, in LAS MIGRACIONES EN AMÉRICA LATINA: POLÍTICAS, CULTURAS Y ESTRATEGIAS 
(Susana Novick ed., 2008). 
12  PABLO CERIANI CERNADAS & DIEGO MORALES, FEDERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS, ARGENTINA: AVANCES Y ASIGNATURAS PENDIENTES EN LA CONSOLIDACIÓN 
DE UNA POLÍTICA MIGRATORIA BASADA EN LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, 9-10 (2011).  
13  See Law No. 25871, Jan. 21, 2004, [30322] B.O. 2 [hereinafter the 2004 Law]. 
14  E.g. id. arts. 17, 61, 70. 
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expense of the State, and a presumption against detention during those 
proceedings.15 
The 2004 Law is not only about migrants’ rights, however, and it 
includes more traditional immigration priorities related to public security 
and economic development. One evident limitation on the right to migrate 
appears in a set of provisions that prevent persons who have committed 
certain crimes from entering or remaining in the country.16 In essence, the 
right to migrate is tempered by certain expectations that a migrant comply 
with the laws in his home country as well as the laws of Argentina, and a 
failure to meet such expectations can lead to the State’s refusal to grant 
entry or the termination of legal residency.17 Notably, only serious crimes 
prevented migration under the 2004 Law, and these legal impediments 
were clearly balanced against fundamental human rights considerations 
such as family unity. 
On January 27, 2017, President Macri issued a Decree of Necessity and 
Urgency (in Spanish, “DNU”), a novel feature of the 1994 Constitution 
that permits a sitting President to pass a law, if both houses of Congress do 
not oppose the law.18 The DNU set forth statistics, claiming that 
immigrants were disproportionately represented in the prison population, 
and that a substantial proportion of them were imprisoned for drug 
crimes.19 These statistics, together with President Macri’s observation that 
expulsion proceedings “may last” as long as seven years, were used to 
justify the establishment of a summary expulsion procedure for persons 
with criminal history, as well as other irregular migrants, and greater 
authority to detain migrants in expulsion proceedings.20 Shortly after the 
DNU was issued, civil society organizations argued that the President had 
overrepresented the actual proportion of immigrants in prison, and that the 
modifications to the existing law were not justified by a situation of 
 
 
15  See id. tit. VI.; see also id. art. 70. 
16  See id. arts. 29, 63. 
17  Article 5 of the 2004 Law is evidence of this tempering or restriction of the impact and reach 
of the anti-discriminatory aims of the 2004 Law. Article 5 requires that “‘the government guarantee . . 
. equal treatment . . . so long as [foreigners] satisfy the established conditions for their entry and stay 
[in the country], according to the laws . . . .’” Hines, supra note 5, at 490-91 (citing the 2004 Law, art. 
5.) Hines argues that “[a] literal reading of the text of this article could lead to the conclusion that 
some type of disparate treatment might still be permissible against persons in irregular status. Such an 
interpretation would contravene the more liberal provisions of the law . . . .” Id. 
18  Art. 99.3, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [Const. Nac.] (Arg.). 
19  DNU, supra note 1, Preamble (claiming that while immigrants only made up 4.5% of the 
Argentine population overall, they made up more than 21% of the prison population, and that 33% of 
all persons incarcerated for drug crimes were immigrants). 
20  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
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necessity or urgency.21 At that point, however, the DNU was law and there 
was insufficient political will for both houses of Congress to nullify the 
Decree, as required by the constitution.22 
The DNU drastically expanded the types of criminal activity that will 
provide a basis for the denial of admission or the cancelation of residency. 
Under current law, if there is a reason to believe that a non-citizen has 
committed a crime that could be punished with imprisonment, the non-
citizen is inadmissible, and if the immigrant has lawful residency, that 
status is automatically canceled.23 For many, there is no defense, and no 
opportunity to argue equitable considerations such as family unity. Such 
non-citizens are funneled into a summary expulsion procedure that 
provides only three days to respond to the charges, and another three days 
to appeal an adverse decision.24 Moreover, the law increases the likelihood 
of detention during the pendency of those proceedings.25  
At the time of this writing, the DNU is embroiled in litigation with an 
appeal pending before the Argentine Supreme Court that will decide the 
fate of the Decree. First, a federal judge largely rejected a collective legal 
challenge to the DNU brought by civil society organizations, suggesting 
that individuals must challenge the law to defend their individual rights.26 
Then, an appeals court ruled that the DNU is unconstitutional, with two 
judges finding that the President had failed to establish the requisite 
“necessity and urgency,” and a third judge finding that the Decree violated 
various rights guarantees under Argentine law.27 The case is now pending 
 
 
21  See, e.g., Senate Debate, Feb. 16, 2017 (translation by author). 
22  This conclusion is drawn from interviews with immigration experts in Argentina, and can be 
inferred from a Senate debate that began in February 2017, and to date has not reconvened to finish 
discussion or vote on the matter. 
23  DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying article 29 of the 2004 Law); id. art. 7 (modifying article 
62 of the 2004 Law). 
24  DNU, supra note 1, arts. 9-20. 
25  DNU, supra note 1, art. 21 (modifying article 70 of the 2004 Law). 
26  Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 1 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative 
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo 
Ley 16.986,” https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf, at 3-4 
(agreeing with an opinion filed by the Public Minister who found that the collective process was an 
inappropriate mechanism to bring claims related to the termination of residency and the family 
reunification waiver due to the individualized nature of the rights at issue, and pronouncing that the 
court would not analyze these claims so as not to be redundant).  
27  Cámara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal 
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. 
EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf, at 45 (Judge Treacy finding that the DNU is an 
unconstitutional overreach of executive power, inasmuch as it constitutes legislation that does not meet 
the specific constitutional requirements of necessity and urgency set forth in article 99.3 of the 
constitution); id. at 47 (Judge Gallegos Fedriani adopting the opinion of Judge Treacy); id. at 17-19 
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before the Argentine Supreme Court, which granted the government’s 
petition for extraordinary review, leaving the fate of the 2017 Decree 
uncertain.28 The pending appeal suspends the judgment of the appeals 
court, and permits the government to continue to apply the DNU,29 such 
that individual immigrants are now compelled to formulate their own 
challenges to the law to defend against expulsion.  
This Article argues that the persistence of the right to migrate under 
Argentine law, together with international human rights norms embedded 
in the 2004 Law and the Argentine Constitution, may provide an important 
safeguard against the most deleterious effects of the DNU. The discussion 
will proceed in three parts. The first part will examine the evolution of 
immigrant rights in Argentina. It will begin with a brief historical account 
of immigration regulation in Argentina, and describe the forces that 
brought about the seismic shift in the 2004 Law. It will then summarize 
the main provisions of the 2004 immigration law and the 2010 regulations 
that accompany that law, with a particular focus on the law’s substantive 
rights and procedural guarantees. 
The second part of this Article will present the DNU, its rationale, and 
its main provisions, and will highlight the ways in which the DNU 
modifies the 2004 Law. In particular, this section will examine those ways 
in which the DNU serves to undermine the progressive provisions of the 
2004 Law summarized in the first section. It will emphasize in particular 
the predictable effects of the summary expulsion procedure, as compared 
to the robust procedures that existed under the prior law, and the likely 
strain on the fundamental right to family unity. This section will then 
examine the early results of a collective action that challenged the 
constitutionality of the DNU, denouncing various provisions of the law as 
inconsistent with international human rights law and the Argentine 
Constitution. 
The third part of the Article will argue that international human rights 
law, applied directly though Argentine law, may be used to uphold some 
key aspects of the right to migrate in Argentina. In particular, this section 
 
 
(Judge Alemany invalidating the summary expulsión procedure, the detention provisions, and the 
limitations on the family reunification waiver, discussed in sections X, XI, and XII of his opinion, 
respectively) (translation by author). 
28  Maia Jastreblansky, Inquietud en el Gobierno por un fallo de la Corte que define el alcance 
de los DNU, LA NACIÓN (July 10, 2018), https://www.lanacion.com.ar/2151660-inquietud-en-el-
gobierno-por-un-fallo-de-la-corte-que-define-el-alcance-de-los-dnu. 
29  Martín Bravo, La Corte deberá resolver otro tema sensible para el Gobierno: el DNU por 
los extranjeros, CLARÍN (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.clarin.com/politica/corte-debera-resolver-tema-
sensible-gobierno-dnu-extranjeros_0_r1Ub8gaoM.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
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will present relevant human rights norms that protect the substantive rights 
of migrants, most notably to family unity, as well as procedural 
protections that should be accorded to them. There is potential, through 
individual litigation, if not the collective litigation still pending on appeal, 
to assert core international human rights protections for unauthorized 
migrants and residents alike who face summary expulsion procedure under 
the new law. By ensuring the dignity of migrants, made exceedingly 
vulnerable under the DNU, Argentina may still prevent the complete 
erosion of the right to migrate established under the 2004 Law. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA 
Argentina passed an immigration law in 2004 that has been widely 
regarded as a model for humane immigration regulation. One of the most 
ground-breaking developments in this regard was the decision by 
Argentine legislators to characterize migration as a right, which many 
have suggested laid the groundwork for understanding migration as a 
human right.30 This is particularly significant when understood in the 
context of Argentine history, inasmuch as the 2004 Law followed a 
century of repressive immigration regulation. This section will examine 
the evolution of immigrant rights in Argentina though a brief review of the 
history that led to the passage of the 2004 Law. It will consider the novel 
legal framework enacted in 2004, and focus in particular on clusters of 
provisions that establish substantial substantive rights for migrants and 
robust procedural and judicial protection for persons in expulsion 
proceedings. 
A. A brief history of Argentine immigration law 
In the early years of the Argentine Republic, the government viewed 
immigration as essential to the growth and establishment of the State. This 
idea was enshrined in the Argentine Constitution in 1853, which 
announced that “to govern is to populate,” suggesting both that 
immigration policies were intertwined with the authority of the State, and 
that such policies should promote immigration.31 This was reflected in the 
first immigration law, the Avellaneda Law, passed in 1876 with the goal 
of encouraging immigration to populate and develop the vast Argentine 
 
 
30  See Hines, supra note 5. 
31  See Hines, supra note 7, at 395-96.  
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territory.32 A policy of largely open borders continued as the country 
received waves of European migration through the nineteenth century, but 
with the express understanding that migration should be European.33 
In 1902, the Argentine legislature passed the Residence Law, Law No. 
4144, which limited immigration. Specifically, the Residence Law 
“authorized the executive branch to expel or prevent the entry of 
foreigners whose conduct compromised national security or public order,” 
which provided the authority to discriminate against migrants on the basis 
of political ideology.34 The law’s origins date back to a Senate debate in 
1899, in which Senator Miguel Cané proposed that the Senate deport 
“foreigners who endangered order and security.”35 He spoke of immigrants 
with powerful and condemning language, saying that they were “enemies 
of the social order with the intent of committing the foulest of crimes in 
pursuit of a . . . chaotic ideal that defies intelligence and chills the heart.”36 
The following years in Argentina marked the growth of labor movements, 
and immigrants formed the base of Argentina’s new urban working 
class.37 The Residence Law ushered in a period of institutional and 
systematic discrimination against the immigrant community as a response 
to this societal shift.38  
Under the Residence law, the Executive had the power to order 
individuals deported and to detain them from the moment of the order 
until their final deportation.39 They would be deported in three days, with 
 
 
32  Novick, supra note 11, at 3-4.  
33  Article 25 of the Constitution of 1853 stated that “the Federal Government shall encourage 
European Immigration.” Art. 25, 1853 CONSTITUCIÓN ARGENTINA. Some argue that this article 
expresses merely a “preference” toward European immigration because the subsequent clause decrees 
that all persons coming to Argentina from abroad “to carry out the goals listed in the Constitution have 
the right to enter the country.” Hines, supra note 7, at 396. Hines argues that “[n]evertheless, the fact 
that the Constitution specifically promotes European immigration affects the current immigration 
debate, given that the majority of recent immigrants are from neighboring Latin American countries.” 
Id. at 396-97. 
34  See Hines, supra note 5, at 480. This law can be compared to the Immigration Act of 1920 in 
the United States, which “provid[ed] for the exclusion of [individuals] who advocated [for] the 
overthrow of the government[,] . . . opposed organized government, or who was a member of any 
organization teaching [such] views.” Id. at 480 n.20. 
35  Gabriela Anahí Costanzo, The Inadmissible Turned History: The 1902 Law of Residence and 
the 1910 Law of Social Defense, 3 SOCIEDAD (BUENOS AIRES) (2007), 
http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0327-77122007000200001. 
36  See id. 
37  Jeane DeLaney, National Identity, Nationhood, and Immigration in Argentina: 1810-1930, 
5.2 STAN. ELECTRONIC HUMAN. REV. 7 (1997), https://web.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-2/delaney.html.  
38  María Inés Pacecca, Personas extranjeras en cárceles federales: vulnerabilidad y 
discriminación, in Discriminaciones étnicas y nacionales: un diagnóstico participativo 127, 127 
(Corina Courtis & María Inés Pacecca eds., 2011). 
39  See id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
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no means provided, judicial or otherwise, to defend themselves or fight the 
order.40 In the first week after passing the law, 500 people were deported.41 
In addition to this broad power to deport, article 3 of the Residence Law 
also gave the executive the power to block the entry of anyone whose 
background indicated that they may compromise the public order.42 In 
1932, the Supreme Court decided a constitutional challenge against the 
Residence Law on behalf of thirty-three detained migrants in the 
Transporte Chaco case.43 The Court upheld the Residence Law, reasoning 
that the right of migrants under the Constitution to “till the soil, improve 
industry, and teach the arts and sciences, did not prevent the government 
from expelling those whose residence did not fulfill these goals.”44 The 
Court also held that the Constitution’s guarantee of the right to work and 
reside in Argentina did not protect those who “threaten[ed] the public 
order.”45  
The military government that came to power in 1976 doubled down on 
the commitment to restrictive immigration regulation with the 1981 Videla 
Law, which gave near complete authority to the executive in immigration 
matters.46 The stated purpose of the Videla Law was “to promote 
immigration of those persons ‘whose cultural characteristics allow for 
adequate integration into Argentine society.’”47 Notably, this corresponded 
with a demographic shift in migration to Argentina during this time. 
Indeed, while migrants to Argentina had primarily been European through 
the first half of the twentieth century, regional migration from Latin 
American was on the rise in this period.48 Regardless, even for those 
 
 
40  See id. at 128. 
41  See Costanzo, supra note 35, at 4.  
42  Law No. 4144, Nov. 22, 1902, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 560, 560.  
43  See Hines, supra note 5, at 480, n.56. 
44  See id. (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of 
Justice], 6/5/1932, “Simón Scheimberg y Enrique Corona Martinez / habeas corpus en representación 
de treinta y tres extranjeros detenidos en el 'Transporte Chaco' de la Armada Nacional,” Fallos (1932-
164-344) (Arg.)).  
45  See id.  
46  Law No. 22439, Mar. 23, 1981, [XLI-A] A.D.L.A. 1581. Notably, the undocumented 
population increased as a result of the restrictive nature of the Videla Law. Experts and government 
officials widely agree on this. See Hines, supra note 5, at 475-76. The Videla law “provided very few 
avenues for legal immigration, particularly for those from neighboring countries and delegated near 
unbridled discretion to immigration officials to deny, delay, or impede applications for legal status.” 
Id. 
47  See Hines, supra note 5, at 481 (citing Law No. 22439, art. 2., Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 
273 (repealed)). 
48  See Hines, supra note 7, at 397 (citing Raúl C. Rey Balmaceda, El Pasado: la Inmigración 
en la Historia Argentina, in 2 GEODOMOS 19, 44 (Graciela M. de Marco et al. eds., 1994) (noting that 
17.8% of the immigrant population in Argentina hailed from neighboring Latin American countries by 
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migrants who had the desired “cultural characteristics,” legal paths for 
immigration were seldom available.49 
The military government practiced systematic grave violations of 
human rights in order to maintain social and political control over the 
country, and this extended to immigration regulation as well.50 Non-
citizens were deported “for illegal entry, violation of the terms of stay, 
criminal conduct, and threats to national security or public order, without 
even minimal due process.”51 Furthermore, the Videla Law had harsh 
mandatory reporting requirements, which demanded that both citizens and 
government officials “report undocumented immigrants who engaged in 
commercial transactions, attempted to marry, or sought medical 
treatment.”52 These provisions, coupled with largely unfettered authority 
provided to officials to conduct searches for immigration violations 
“without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a court order,”53 led to 
frequent abuses of power in the detention and expulsion of immigrants.54  
When the military dictatorship was finally ousted in 1983, political 
leaders mobilized to install a system of government that would respect 
fundamental human rights. This impulse was enshrined in the 1994 
Constitution, which directly incorporated major international and regional 
human rights treaties into domestic Argentine law, and in some cases, 
codified human rights as on par with the Constitution itself.55 
Nevertheless, the 1994 Constitution gave broad authority to the Argentine 
legislature to regulate immigration in the manner it deemed appropriate 
 
 
1960, and by 1980 regional migration had increased significantly). 
49  Id. 
50  Article 20 of Law No. 22439 decreed that the “right of a foreigner to enter, reside and leave 
the country, a right guaranteed to all inhabitants under article 14 of the Argentine Constitution, is 
limited by the immigration laws.” See Hines, supra note 7, at 395-96 (citing Law. No. 22439, art. 20, 
Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)). This provides context on the power of the immigration 
laws to restrict the rights afforded to migrants.  
51  See Hines, supra note 5, at 481(citing Law. No. 22439, art. 3, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 
273 (repealed)) (discussing the authority to remove immigrants for not following the law). 
52  Id. (citing Law No. 22439, arts. 32, 105, 101, 103, 104, 106, Mar. 23 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 
273 (repealed)). 
53  Id. (citing Law No. 22439, art. 107, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)). 
54  The Videla Law also restricted the ability of undocumented immigrants to integrate into 
Argentine society. For example, the law decreed that only permanent or temporary residents could 
attend secondary school. Id. (citing Law. No. 22439, art. 102, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 2713 
(repealed)). Undocumented immigrants were also not permitted to purchase or rent property, and any 
seller or landlord who allowed for this would be fined. Id. (citing Law No. 24393, art. 48, Nov. 18, 
1994, [1994-C] L.A. 3228 (modifying Law No. 22439, art. 48, Mar. 23 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273); 
Law. No. 22439, arts. 32, 48, Mar. 23, 1981, [1981-A] L.A. 273 (repealed)). 
55  Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or 
Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 288-92 (1999). 
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and in the national interest.56 Indeed, the new Constitution did nothing to 
specifically curtail the broad immigration authority of the executive under 
the dictatorship era Videla Law, notwithstanding inconsistencies between 
the exercise of that authority and human rights law.57 Notably, during this 
same period, the trend of increased regional migration continued with 
nearly half of the immigrants in Argentina originating from Latin 
American countries.58 
In 2002, in a drastic shift in the restrictive immigration policy that had 
characterized the previous century, Argentina entered into a free 
movement agreement with other member nations of the South American 
trading bloc, Mercosur. Negotiations that ultimately led to the approval of 
the “Agreement on Residence for Nationals of State Parties in Mercosur” 
opened with a Brazilian proposal for a “migration amnesty for Mercosur 
nationals living elsewhere within the bloc without authorization.”59 
However, based on its own recent experience with such regularization 
programs, Argentina was unconvinced that a temporary amnesty would be 
sufficient to alleviate the problem of irregular migration and countered 
with a proposal for a “permanent, rather than temporary, mechanism for 
Mercosur citizens to gain access to regular status.”60 Ultimately, 
Argentina’s proposal prevailed and created a pathway to permanent 
residency for Mercosur citizens living and working within the bloc.61 It 
also established many rights for migrants, such as the right to family 
reunification, the right to equal working conditions, and the right to 
 
 
56  Article 75, paragraph 18 of the Constitution of 1994 allows for “’Powers of Congress . . . [t]o 
provide whatever is conducive to the prosperity of the country, to the progress and welfare of all the 
Provinces and for the advancement of . . . immigration . . . .’” Hines, supra note 7, at 396 n.5. Article 
67, paragraphs 11, 16, and 28 of the Constitution of 1853 are also examples of the broad powers 
provided to the government to regulate immigration, according to Hines. See id. 
57  Of particular importance were lawsuits brought by the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales 
(CELS) and the Comisión Argentina de Refugiados (CAREF). The government actually stated to 
CELS in negotiations on the case of Juan Carlos de la Torre, which was a case in front of the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights of a Uruguayan individual who had resided in Argentina 
with his Argentine-born wife and children, that it was willing to reform the Videla Law in order to 
comply with human rights standards. See Hines, supra note 5, at 483-84 (citing Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 22/12/2998, “Recurso de hecho 
deducido por la defensa de De La Torre, Juan Carlos en la causa De la Torre, Juan Carlos / habeas 
corpus,” Fallos (1998-321-3646) (Arg.)). 
58  See Hines, supra note 7, at 397-98 (citation omitted) (highlighting that roughly half of 
Argentina’s foreign-born population of 1.6 million came from surrounding Latin American countries 
in 1991). 
59  Diego Acosta, Free Movement in South America: The Emergence of an Alternative Model?, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-
south-america-emergence-alternative-model. 
60  Id.  
61  Id.  
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education for children.62 This treaty “transformed the migration regime for 
South Americans,”63 and Argentina followed this exceptional regional 
development with the progressive national immigration legislation in 
2004.  
Argentina’s 2004 Law 25.871 set forth four clusters of objectives for 
immigration regulation in Argentina.64 The first clear and overarching 
concern was with the development of the nation. This is evidenced by the 
interest in pursuing demographic goals in terms of population distribution 
and growth,65 the goal of advancing commerce, tourism, science and 
technology,66 and incorporating labor migrants for the benefit of the 
republic.67 At the same time, there was a second, perhaps more subtle 
concern for the integration of migrants into Argentine society. This was 
expressed through the articulated needs to fortify Argentine culture 
through immigration,68 and to integrate permanent residents into the social 
fabric of the country.69 Third, there was expressed concern for the 
relationship between immigration and criminality. Indeed, the law 
articulated the objectives of denying entry or expelling those persons 
engaged in acts punishable under Argentine criminal law,70 as well as 
combating international organized crime through immigration regulation.71 
Finally, the law promoted the fundamental human rights of migrants.72 It 
recalled the country’s international obligations in the areas of human 
rights, equality, and human mobility,73 and made specific reference to the 
needs to promote family unity74 and combat discrimination.75  
 
 
62  Id.  
63  Id. 
64  See The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 3. 
65  Id. art. 3(b). 
66  Id. art. 3(i). 
67  Id. art. 3(h). 
68  Id. art. 3(c). 
69  Id. art. 3(e). 
70  Id. art. 3(j). 
71  Id. art. 3(k). 
72  The 1994 Constitution gave “constitutional hierarchy to ten major international treaties that 
Argentina had ratified at the time of the reform.” It was within this context of focus on human rights 
that Argentina enacted and crafted the 2004 Law. See Hines, supra note 5, at 482 (citing Levit, supra 
note 55, at 288-91). The 2004 Law was compatible with the constitution, according to Eugenio 
Zaffaroni, a constitutional scholar and member of the Supreme Court in Argentina. He stated that the 
passage of the 2004 law “’signifie[d] the reestablishment of legal compatibility with constitutional 
directives.’” Id. at 485 (citing Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni, Migración y Discriminación: La Nueva Ley en 
Perspectiva Histórica, in MIGRACIÓN: UN DERECHO HUMANO 45 (Prometeo 2004)). 
73  The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 3(a). 
74  Id. art. 3(d). 
75  Id. art. 3(f). 
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The first three categories of objectives set forth in the law are common 
in immigration legislation, and unsurprising when considered against the 
backdrop of the century of immigration regulation that preceded the 2004 
Law. Rights protection as an aspect of immigration regulation is much 
more novel. Javier de Lucas writes that states are often concerned with: (1) 
managing the immigrant population within the country, usually with a 
focus on meeting the needs of the labor market, maintaining public order, 
and integrating immigrants; (2) regulating migrant flows, commonly 
reduced to border policy; and (3) conducting foreign relations with 
countries that send migrants.76 According to de Lucas, states often do little 
to legislate immigrant rights because they are not viewed as essential to 
the primary considerations of security and the market.77 
Moreover, states are generally disinclined to approach migration as a 
right because such a conception limits their authority to manage immigrant 
flows. Miguel Carbonell has suggested that states resist the 
characterization of migration as a right because it requires a reexamination 
of the rationale of borders in a socio-legal context, and a movement 
towards the individual liberty of migrants.78 While the 2004 Argentine law 
reflects the three major areas of concern highlighted by de Lucas, it is 
remarkable in the strides it made to articulate and protect migrants’ 
fundamental rights.79  
B. The rights protective framework of the 2004 Law 
 
 
76  Javier de Lucas, Por qué no son prioritarios los derechos humanos en las políticas de 
inmigración (July 7, 2002) (7th Óscar Romero Migration & Solidarity Conference Committee paper), 
http://www.comitesromero.org/murcia/jornadas/DeLucas.html#tth_sEc3 (elaborating on the reasons 
and evidence that immigrant rights are not taken seriously in the debate about immigration policy). 
77  Id. at 2. 
78  Miguel Carbonell, Derecho a Migrar, in INSTITUCIONES SOCIALES EN EL 
CONSTITUTICIONALISMO CONTEMPORÁNEO 59, 62-63 (Héctor Fix-Zamudio & Diego Valadés eds., 2d 
ed. 2011), http://miguelcarbonell.com/artman/uploads/1/Derecho_a_Migrar.pdf. 
79  This focus on fundamental human rights is not only evident in the text but is also clear in the 
statements made by Argentinian officials at the time. For example, Argentine Ambassador, Leonardo 
Franco, spoke to the United Nations about the 2004 Law and said,  
[T]he search for better conditions of life in other countries must not be reproachable and 
[must be] much less criminalized . . . . Argentina sealed this new spirit in its migrations 
policies through the National Law of Migrations in 2004. This new law reflects the 
commitment of our country to guarantee the full respect of human rights of the migrants and 
their families and the sams [sic] time establishes mechanisms of easy access to regulate 
migration, thus contributing to the elimination of any form of discrimination, xenophobia or 
racism.  
Hines, supra note 5, at 485. (citing Susana Novick, Una Nueva Ley para un Nuevo Modelo de 
Desarrollo en un Contexto de Crisis y Consenso, in Migración: un Derecho Humano 19, 67, 84-85 
(Prometeo 2004)). 
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This section considers the specific legal provisions of the 2004 Law as 
a means of exploring a broader conception of immigrant rights in 
Argentina. This discussion is divided into two parts, and begins with an 
examination of the first title of the law that sets forth what could be 
considered an immigrant bill of rights. This discussion examines the novel 
“right to migrate” introduced by the 2004 Law, and discusses other key 
protections such as the rights to equal protection of the law, family unity, 
and the mandate that the State must regularize the situation of migrants.  
The second part of the discussion explores the procedural and judicial 
protections under the 2004 Law. These include an opportunity for 
immigrants to regularize their status before the State may pursue 
expulsion, a robust system of administrative and appellate review of an 
expulsion order, and free legal services provided by the State to indigent 
immigrants throughout this procedure.80 There is also a presumption 
against immigrant detention and strong judicial control over any detention 
that does occur in this context. Together, the immigrant bill of rights in 
conjunction with procedural and judicial protections created a progressive 
and rights-centered model of migration regulation. 
1. An immigrant bill of rights 
The first chapter of the 2004 Law is titled “The Rights and Liberties of 
Foreigners,” which suggests an immigrant bill of rights. The bill of rights 
includes a novel right to migrate;81 equal protection under the law and 
freedom from discrimination;82 access to education and healthcare;83 
access to information and the means of integration;84 the right to family 
unity;85 political rights;86 labor rights;87 property rights;88 and a catch-all 
 
 
80  This is consistent with the way advocates speak about immigrant rights under the 2004 Law. 
See, e.g., CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, MIGRANTES 1, 62 (Paula Arturo trans., 2013), 
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Migrantes.pdf (indicating that the 2004 Law 
“required the State to establish mechanisms for regulating immigration, ensuring access to justice in 
any deportation or detention procedure, while eliminating distinctions between the rights of Argentine 
nationals and those foreign born.”). 
81  The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 4 (translation by author). 
82  Id. arts. 5, 6, 13 (this broad anti-discrimination provision of the law establishes as 
discriminatory all acts or omissions motivated by ethnicity, religion, nationality, ideology, political 
opinion, sex, gender, economic situation or physical characteristics, which arbitrarily impedes equal 
enjoyment of rights guaranteed under laws, the constitution, or international treaties). 
83  Id. arts. 7, 8. 
84  Id. arts. 9, 14. 
85  Id. art. 10. 
86  Id. art. 11. 
87  Id. art. 16. 
88  Id. art. 15. 
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provision that incorporates rights guaranteed under international law.89 
Finally, the bill of rights creates an obligation on the State to implement 
measures to regularize the legal status of migrants.90 
The revolutionary scope of the 2004 Law is perhaps embodied in the 
“right to migrate.”91 The right to migrate is described as “essential and 
inalienable,” and the Republic of Argentina commits to guarantee this 
right in accordance with the principles of equality and universality.”92 The 
law itself does not elaborate on the content of this right, but courts have 
since described it as a “paradigm shift” in the State’s relationship with 
migrants that compels Argentine authorities to regularize migrants, 
interpret the law favorably to the migrant, and treat expulsion as a measure 
of last resort.93 
In an early decision interpreting the 2004 Law, a federal appeals court 
made clear the significance of the change in immigration policy that 
emanated from the codification of a right to migrate. In Li Yun, Lingyan 
Zheng, and Yu Junyun, a court reviewed the case of three Chinese 
migrants who had been detained by immigration authorities after crossing 
the border without authorization.94 In discussing the rights of the women, 
the court referred to the right to migrate as a “revolutionary precedent” 
that converted migration into a “substantive right that does not depend on 
the will of any State.”95 The court expressed concern that this sentiment 
had not penetrated actual practices of migration officials on the border, but 
emphasized that the 2004 Law had heralded a new era after the 
persecutory Videla Law.96 The court in turn ordered that the three women 
should be released from detention, guaranteed a lawyer at the expense of 
the State, and provided assistance in regularizing their immigration status. 
This shift is stunning when considered against the backdrop of the 
previous century of immigration regulation in Argentina. It is also 
remarkable in its implications for the limits on sovereign authority over 
the entry of non-citizens into Argentine territory. The right to migrate 
 
 
89  Id. art. 12. 
90  Id. art. 17. 
91  Id. art. 4. 
92  Id. 
93  Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative 
Litigation Court], 11/11/2013, “García Castro, Jhon Darwin c. EN-M Interior-DNM-Disp. 264/10 
(Expte. 2.167.684/06) / recurso directo para juzgados,” (No. 10879/2010), 8-9 (translation by author), 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/GC,%20JD.pdf. 
94  Cámara Federal De Apelaciones de Paraná [CFed.], 10/12/2004, “Li Yun, Lingyan Zheng y 
Yu Junyun / habeas corpus,” L.S. Crim. (2004-II-396) (Arg.) (translation by author). 
95  Id. at 3. 
96  Id. 
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bestowed certain rights on the individual migrant that the State could not 
infringe, and thus represented a “paradigm shift.” Indeed, the 2004 Law 
not only prevented authorities from detaining irregular migrants at the 
border, it required that they facilitate the entry of such migrants by 
supplying them with legal counsel and time to prepare a case for 
residency.97 
Just as the “right to migrate” facilitated the entry of some, it converted 
expulsion into an “extreme measure of last resort.”98 Indeed, in GC, JD a 
court cited the “right to migrate” in nullifying the expulsion order of a 
Uruguayan man who had been convicted of a drug trafficking crime and 
sentenced to approximately one year in prison while living without 
authorization in Argentina. This case required that the court interpret 
article 29(c) of the 2004 Law, which provided various criminal grounds 
for inadmissibility, including drug trafficking or a crime punishable by 
three years or more under Argentine law.99 The court interpreted the 
provision of the law to require a sentence of three years or more for the 
drug trafficking crime, a generous interpretation that blocked the 
application of article 29(c) to the man, who was permitted to remain in 
Argentina.100 
This jurisprudence on the “right to migrate” demonstrates that it may 
be deployed to assist persons crossing the border to get out of detention 
and secure representation, or assist someone defending against an order of 
expulsion. The scope of this right to enter or stay, however, is really just 
the tip of the iceberg, as the immigrant bill of rights offers an expansive 
set of affirmative rights to immigrants present in Argentina. 
For example, the bill of rights includes a proclamation of rights parity 
between nationals and migrants in social services, public goods, 
healthcare, education, justice, labor, employment, and social security. 
Moreover, regulations promulgated in 2010 to provide greater guidance 
explicitly recognized the role of the State in promoting the equal rights of 
migrants by requiring the immigration authorities to act as the guardians of 
human rights and the right to migrate announced in the 2004 Law.101 The 
regulations further created a mandate for the federal government to 
 
 
97  Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative 
Litigation Court], 11/11/2013, “García Castro, Jhon Darwin c. EN-M Interior-DNM-Disp. 264/10 
(Expte. 2.167.684/06) / recurso directo para juzgados,” (No. 10879/2010), 8 (translation by author), 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/GC,%20JD.pdf. 
98  Id. at 9. 
99  Id. at 8. 
100 Id. at 9-10. 
101 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 6. 
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collaborate with provincial and municipal governments on programs to 
integrate migrants into society and guarantee their equal access to the wide 
range of rights set forth in the law.102 This naturally reinforces the 
obligation on the State established under the 2004 Law to facilitate the 
integration of migrants, including through language classes, orientations 
about rights and responsibilities, events honoring the culture and traditions 
of immigrant populations, and courses to promote multiculturalism and 
anti-discrimination.103  
The 2004 Law also elaborates on the rights to education and healthcare, 
which it implicitly recognizes as among the most fundamental rights for 
migrants. In terms of education, the law states that immigration status 
should never hinder access to education at any level, public or private.104 
Similarly, it requires that access to healthcare must be provided to all, 
independent of immigration status.105 Further, the law creates an obligation 
for educational institutions and healthcare providers to assist migrants with 
the regularization of their immigration status.106 This makes explicit the 
bridge between the mandate to guarantee social and economic rights to 
migrants in Argentina, and the mandate to regularize the status of the 
immigrant population, discussed more below. 
The bill of rights also creates an obligation on the Argentine State to 
provide information to migrants about their rights under the law, and in 
particular the legal requirements for their admission and stay.107 The law 
further emphasizes that the State will coordinate the provision of this 
information with employers and unions, and that the information will be 
free and in languages that migrants can understand.108 The 2010 
Regulations that followed further require regular capacity-building 
seminars for immigration agents, including immigration police, on the 
rights of migrants under the law.109 They also include a broader mandate to 
organize a system of information and education for both public and private 
entities that have regular contact with immigrants, including the education, 
health, housing, and transportation sectors.110  
The 2004 Law includes a unique mandate to promote the right to 
 
 
102 Id. 
103 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 14. 
104 Id. art. 7. 
105 Id. art. 8. 
106 Id. arts. 7, 8. 
107 Id. art. 9. 
108 Id. 
109 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 9(a). 
110 Id. art. 9(b). 
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political participation of migrants in Argentina, recognizing their right to a 
voice in the selection of persons who will govern them. Broadly, the law 
requires the government to provide foreigners with the knowledge and 
means to participate in decisions about public life,111 and the 2010 
regulations provided the specific requirement for the City of Buenos Aires 
to orient migrants about their right to vote.112 
The immigrant bill of rights also directly incorporates all international 
legal obligations to protect migrant rights.113 The 2004 Law gives 
particular emphasis to the right to family reunification for immigrants, and 
defines relevant family members as spouses, parents, minor children, and 
children with limited capacity no matter their age.114 The 2010 Regulations 
specifically provided the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Their Families as one source of the legal protection of 
immigrant families,115 inasmuch as it requires “appropriate measures to 
ensure the protection of the unity of the families of migrant workers.”116 
This right to family reunification has developed into a core feature of the 
“paradigm shift” under the 2004 Law, and it is important to elaborate on 
the contours of that protection. 
The importance of family reunification under the 2004 Law is evident 
in the number of prominent references to this right. Indeed, family unity is 
listed as one of the overarching objectives of the law,117 as one of the core 
protections in the immigrant bill of rights,118 and it is a basis for a waiver 
of inadmissibility and cancelation of residence, even when an immigrant 
has committed a crime.119  
One example of how the right to family reunification influences 
immigration policy can be found in the 2007 case Zhang, Hang, in which 
the spouse of a Chinese resident in Argentina was denied a visa after she 
allegedly tried to bribe a consular officer at the Argentine embassy in 
 
 
111 Id. art. 11. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. art. 12. 
114 Id. art. 10. 
115 Id. 
116 G.A. Res. 45/148, 1990, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (Dec. 18, 1990). 
117 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 3(d) (Article 3(d) sets forth as an objective of the Law 
to “guarantee the exercise of the of the right to family reunification.”) (translation by author).  
118 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 10 (Article 10, in the title “rights and liberties,” orders 
that “the State guarantee the right to family reunification of immigrants with their parents, spouses, 
minor children, and children with disability whatever the age.”) (translation by author). 
119 See id. arts. 29, 62 (The last paragraph of Article 29 (inadmissibility) and Article 62 
(cancellation of residence) contain the respective waiver provisions.) 
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China.120 After the decision to deny admission was upheld on appeal, the 
Argentine Supreme Court reversed, writing that “the new Argentine 
immigration policy, Law 25.871, not only repealed the old law . . . but also 
established . . . a substantial change in objectives that must be kept in mind 
for the admission of foreigners.”121 The court rejected the government’s 
decision to deny the visa based on “criminal proclivity,” holding such a 
denial was incompatible with the 2004 Law, and that the principles of 
family reunification must govern all admission decisions.122 
There are also a number of cases that concern the eligibility of an 
immigrant convicted of serious crimes for a waiver of the grounds of 
criminal inadmissibility under article 29(c) of the 2004 Law.123 One of the 
most widely cited cases in this regard is Barrios Rojas, in which an 
appeals court reviewed the expulsion order of a Peruvian woman who had 
 
 
120 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
23/10/2007, “Zhang, Hang c. Estado Nacional-Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto / recurso 
de hecho,” Fallos (2007-330-4554) (Arg.) (translation by author). 
121 Id. at 4.  
122 Id. at 5-6. 
123 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals of 
Salta], 9/3/2015, “Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación-Dirección 
Nacional de Migraciones / Impugnación de Acto Administrativo,” Causa No. FSA 11000053/2012 
(finding a man convicted of four years and eight months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on 
account of the negative impact that would have on his three Argentine daughters); Cámara Federal de 
Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta], 13/03/2015, “Cerruto 
Baleriano c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación – Dirección Naciónal de Migraciones / Amparo Ley 
18.986,” https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf (finding a Bolivian woman 
convicted of six years and five months should not be expelled on account of her three Argentina 
children, husband and mother, all of whom resided in Argentina); Juzgado Contencioso 
Administrativo Federal No. 3. [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/EN,%20WL.pdf (finding a Peruvian man sentenced 
to three years for identity fraud should not be expelled because the man had most of his family in 
Argentina, he had no close family left in Peru, he had reformed his behavior after release from jail, and 
had obtained a steady job); Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 5 [1a Inst.] [Federal 
Administrative Litigation Court], 12/8/2015, “C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11-DNM (expte. 
808848/08) / Recurso Directo Para Juzgados,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(JCAF).pdf; Cámara de Apelaciones 
en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals in Administrative 
Litigation], sala I, 1/9/2016, “C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11-DNM (expte. 308848/08) s/ 
Recurso Directo Para Juzgados,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(CNACAF).pdf (finding a Bolivian 
woman sentenced to four years and six months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account 
of her Argentine husband and the child they had together); Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo 
Federal No. 8 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 2/5/2016, “Benavides Aguilar, 
Mabel Leidy y Otro c. En-M Interior-RSL 1072/11-DNM-RSL87560/09 (expt. 242169/08) / Recurso 
Directo DNM,” https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BA,%20ML.pdf (finding a Peruvian 
woman sentenced to three years in prison for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the 
fact that she was pregnant and currently lived with her boyfriend and his parents, and that her parents 
and siblings also lived in Argentina). 
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been convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to six years in prison.124 
Notably, this case concerned a Mercosur citizen, who would otherwise 
benefit from the regularization plan described above.125 Upon review of 
her application for residency, immigration authorities found that Zoyla 
Cristina Barrios Rojas was inadmissible because of her crime, ordered her 
expelled, and prohibited her readmission for fifteen years.126 An appeals 
court reviewed the trial court’s decision to deny her a waiver of 
inadmissibility for “humanitarian reasons or family reunification” under 
article 29. The appeals court held that the agency action must survive a 
reasonableness test, and found the agency had exercised its discretion in a 
manner that was unreasonable when considering Barrios Rojas’s twenty 
years of residence, marriage in Argentina, and her extensive family 
connections in the country.127 Importantly, the court relied both on the 
provisions of the 2004 Law, and also international human rights law on 
family life and due process.128 
The Barrios Rojas case brings together a number of key considerations 
with regard to the immigrant bill of rights. First, the case arises in the 
context of a regularization plan that broadly promotes regional 
migration.129 Second, the case demonstrates how courts will balance the 
provisions of the law that would serve as a basis for expulsion with the 
humanitarian provisions of the law. In this regard, the case exemplifies a 
broader trend in cases where an immigrant who has committed a crime is 
not expelled because of considerations of family integrity. The case is 
characteristic of a body of jurisprudence that is firmly rooted in 
international human rights obligations that bind Argentina. 
Finally, this case exemplifies the nexus between substantive rights and 
 
 
124 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court 
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2015, “Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. En-
DNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro / recurso directo para juzgados,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BR,%20ZC.pdf, at 1 (translation by author). 
125 Id. at 2; see also Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25871, May 3, 2010, [318989] 
B.O. art. 22(a)-(c); see also Hines, supra note 5, at 510 (citing Decree 616/2010 and explaining that 
“temporary residents of the Mercosur are eligible for permanent residence after two years, while 
temporary residents of other countries become eligible after three years.”).  
126 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court 
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2015, “Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. En-
DNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro / recurso directo para juzgados,” at 2. 
127 Id. at 5-6. 
128 Id. at 3-4. 
129 See also Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 
17 (requiring that immigration authorities issue dispositions to make immigration processes more 
accessible, develop a specialized focus on regions of the country that merit such attention, and pursue 
agreements with the public and private sector, as well as foreign governments with resident 
populations in Argentina). 
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the substantial procedural and judicial protections that were afforded to 
Mrs. Barrios Rojas. Indeed, this was a case in which immigration 
authorities exercised their discretion to prioritize the criminal provisions of 
the law over family unity, and the matter had to arrive at a federal appeals 
court to achieve the proper balancing of those considerations. In this 
regard, it is an appropriate segue to a discussion of the law’s procedural 
and judicial protections. 
2. Procedural and judicial protections 
There are many layers of procedural and judicial protection envisioned 
by the 2004 Law, so as to guarantee that migrants have every opportunity 
to regularize their status in Argentina and to defend themselves against 
expulsion. As a preliminary matter, it is important to highlight the 
requirement that immigration authorities must work to regularize the 
situation of any irregular migrant. This initial period during which 
immigration impediments are not enforced is important for two reasons. 
First, it gives the migrant time to secure a lawyer, which the State will 
provide for free if the migrant is indigent. Second, it gives the migrant 
time to organize a defense.  
The significance of this protection was evident in the Li Yun, Lingyan 
Zheng, and Yu Junyun case discussed above, and was reiterated in 2011 in 
a case called Dai Jianquing, and others.130 In Dai Jianquing, a court 
ordered the release from detention of a group of Chinese women who had 
attempted to enter Argentina clandestinely, and took the opportunity to 
emphasize the significance of procedural protections in upholding the right 
to migrate.131 The court reiterated that every migrant present in the 
national territory must have the opportunity to regularize their situation 
before being expelled.132 Moreover, the court highlighted that there were 
procedures set forth for such regularization, and that a migrant has a right 
to counsel provided by the State in confronting those procedures.133 
Finally, the court recalled that detention of migrants was only appropriate 
after an expulsion order had been issued, and that could only happen after 
the migrant had been given the opportunity to regularize his or her status 
with the assistance of counsel.134 
 
 
130 Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Paraná, 11/6/2011, “HC deducido por Dai Jianqing, Lin 
Xuehui, Xie Chenguang y Zhuang Bisheng,” Causa No. 5-17.559-20.768/2011. 
131 Id. at 8-9. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 6. 
134 Id. at 7. 
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The specific framework for this initial procedural opportunity to 
regularize a migrant’s status is set forth in the 2004 Law, and elaborated 
upon in the 2010 Regulations to the law. Specifically, Title III of the 2004 
Law that outlines the rules for entry and exit from the country requires that 
DNM officials should assist irregular migrants in regularizing their status 
when such persons come to their attention.135 The 2010 Regulations 
provide a procedural framework for this process, and give an irregular 
migrant thirty days to regularize her status after she is identified by the 
DNM, with a possible thirty-day extension.136 Nevertheless, if the person’s 
immigration status is not regularized within the framework provided by 
the law, the law requires that the DNM issue an expulsion order.137 As an 
added protection, however, the law provides for the suspension of the 
expulsion order issued, allowing for subsequent review by the appropriate 
tribunal.138 
Next, the 2004 Law provides legal representation at the expense of the 
State for all administrative actions that may lead to a denial of entry at the 
border, a return to the country of origin, or expulsion from Argentina.139 
The 2010 Regulations instruct the DNM to refer all appropriate cases to 
the Defense Division of the Public Ministry,140 which has set up a 
Commission on Migration with broad authority to intervene on behalf of 
immigrants in administrative and judicial proceedings.141 The 2010 
Regulations provided the additional protection that suspends the process 
while the migrant’s appointed counsel makes contact and formulates a 
defense.142 
Two seminal Argentine Supreme Court cases that elaborate the scope 
 
 
135 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 61.  
136 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 61. 
137 The Law of 2004, supra note 13, art. 61. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. art. 86. 
140 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 86. 
141 See Resolución D.G.N. No. 569/11, 13/5/ 2011, 
http://www.mpd.gov.ar/index.php/programas-y-comisiones/56-comision-del-migrante (providing 
authority to represent: “a) Detenidos a disposición de la justicia federal en procesos de expulsión (Ante 
las Delegaciones de la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones de todo el País); b) Detenidos a disposición 
de la justicia federal que se opongan a una expulsión (Sólo respecto de los expediente administrativos 
en trámite ante la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones – delegación Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos 
Aires- ); c) Detenidos cuyo trámite de expulsión devenga de una condena dictada por un Tribunal 
Provincial y se opongan a su salida del país (Sólo respecto de los expediente administrativos en trámite 
ante la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones – delegación Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires); and d) 
En los casos de personas cuya expulsión sea consecuencia de una irregularidad administrativa (Sólo 
respecto de los expediente administrativos en trámite ante la Dirección Nacional de Migraciones – 
delegación Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires- )). 
142 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 86. 
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of this right are Mabuza and Peralta Valiente,143 both of which concerned 
unrepresented migrants who had missed the deadlines to appeal their 
orders of expulsion. In these cases, the court found that the migrants’ 
rights had been violated because they had not been advised of their right to 
appointed counsel, and had not benefitted from the defense of counsel at a 
hearing.144 In Mabuza, the court further found that the DNM had the 
obligation under the law to detect such due process violations and that it 
should revoke an expulsion order in such circumstances.145 In Peralta 
Valiente, the court recalled that the uneven playing field between migrants 
and the DNM required such protection in order to uphold migrants’ rights 
to due process and judicial protection.146 
Notably, courts have also extended the same spirit of these protections 
to cases in which migrants were represented by counsel. For example, in 
DM, E, an appeals court reviewed a case in which appointed counsel for a 
migrant made an untimely filing with the court, which had in turn denied 
the case based on the untimely filing.147 The appeals court found that the 
right to counsel required the lower court to reopen the proceeding in order 
to give effect to the migrant’s right to an adequate defense.148 In CA, EJ, 
another appeals court extended this reasoning to a case where appointed 
counsel was unable to contact a migrant to formulate a defense, and a trial 
court denied an extension and ordered expulsion.149 The appeals court 
considered that the law required appointed counsel to provide a defense, 
and it was unreasonable to expect counsel to make a defense if the migrant 
was unavailable.150 The appeals court insisted that the guarantee of access 
to justice required a suspension of the procedural deadlines if the defense 
counsel could not communicate with the migrant, and ordered that the 
 
 
143 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 6/9/16, 
“Mabuza Moses c. EN-DNM – Disp. 578/12 (Expte. 149957/10) / recurso directo DNM;” Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 26/4/2016, “Peralta 
Valiente c. EN-M Interior – DNM / recurso directo DNM.”  
144 “Mabuza Moses,” at 5-6; “Peralta Valiente”, at 10. 
145 “Mabuza Moses,” at 7 (referring to Law No. 25.871. art. 90). 
146 “Peralta Valiente,” at 7-8. 
147 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court 
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2016, “Diop Matar, Elhadji c. EN-M Interior – 
DNM / recurso directo DNM,” https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/DM,%20E.pdf.  
148 Id. at 3-4. 
149 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court 
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala I, 13/9/2016, “Chein Alvarado, Errol James c. EN-M 
Interior-DNM / recurso directo DNM,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CA,%20EJ.pdf.  
150 Id. at 4. 
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process should be reopened.151 
In addition to the right to judicial protection in the form of the right to 
counsel, the 2004 Law includes a robust system of administrative and 
judicial appeals. First, the law gives a right to administrative review of any 
decision to deny entry at the border, cancel residence, order expulsion, or 
levy a fine for an immigration-related infraction.152 The review may come 
in the form of a request for reconsideration from the immigration official 
that issued an adverse decision,153 or a request that the DNM review the 
decision.154 If the DNM denies the case on review, the migrant has the 
right to either request an additional level of administrative review by the 
Minister of the Interior,155 or finalize administrative review and make a 
judicial appeal.156 
The judiciary has authority to review the final administrative decision 
to ensure that it complied with the requirements of legality, due process, 
and reasonableness.157 An important line of cases in this regard are those 
that exercised judicial review in cases denying residency under the article 
29(c) criminal inadmissibility provision of the 2004 Law, and declining to 
apply the waiver provision for reasons of family reunification.158 In 
considering whether a decision to uphold an order of expulsion is 
reasonable, an appeals court may consider (1) the right to family 
reunification; (2) the best interests of the child; and (3) criminal justice, 
considering that expulsion for crimes may be construed as an additional 
sanction, thereby violating the principle of ne bis in idem.159 In other 
words, the judiciary will review the reasonableness of a discretionary 
administrative decision when it may result in an expulsion that is contrary 
 
 
151 Id. 
152 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 74 (translation by author). 
153 Id. arts. 75-77 (describing the process for a request for reconsideration). 
154 Id. art. 78 (describing the process for administrative review by the DNM, called 
“hierarchical” review). 
155 Id. arts. 79, 81. 
156 Id. arts. 79, 84. 
157 Id. art. 89. 
158 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of 
Salta], 9/3/2015, “Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación-Dirección 
Nacional de Migraciones / Impugnación de Acto Administrativo,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/FH,%20DS.pdf; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de 
Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta], 13/3/2015, “Cerruto Baleriano c. Ministerio 
del Interior de la Nación – Dirección Naciónal de Migraciones / Amparo Ley 18.986,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf.  
159 See “Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación-Dirección 
Nacional de Migraciones / Impugnación de Acto Administrativo,” at 3 (ne bis in idem is more 
commonly referred to as “double jeopardy” under American law). 
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to the goals of the 2004 Law and its fundamental rights protections.160 
During the process of administrative and judicial review, the detention 
of migrants is only permitted in exceptional circumstances. The 2010 
Regulations provide that the DNM must seek a judicial order to detain a 
person in such cases, and that they must make a case for why the person 
will not comply with administrative orders.161 Moreover, where the court 
does issue a judicial order to permit detention, the law requires that the 
DNM provide a report every ten days justifying continued detention.162  
However, when the expulsion order is final, the 2004 Law does give 
the authority to the DNM to detain the migrant for the sole purpose of 
effectuating the expulsion order.163 A migrant may avoid such detention 
with a guarantee that he will leave the country of his own accord. 
Moreover, there is a fail-safe for detained persons who may challenge both 
their detention and expulsion if they have established family ties to an 
Argentine parent, child or spouse.164 In such cases, the law provides for the 
migrants’ immediate release and access to a summary regularization 
procedure.165 
This last point emphasizes once again the interconnectedness between 
the fundamental right to family reunification and procedural protections. 
As illustrated by this discussion of the law itself, as well as the substantial 
body of jurisprudence interpreting the scope of the law, these stand as two 
pillars of protection of immigrant rights in Argentina. However, President 
Macri took aim at both of these protections in his 2017 Decree, and the 
effects on substantive and procedural rights have been substantially 
deteriorated as a result. The following section discusses these 
developments in detail. 
III. RESTRICTIONIST REFORM AND THE ATTACK ON MIGRANTS’ RIGHTS 
On January 27, 2017, President Mauricio Macri issued Decree of 
Necessity and Urgency (“DNU”) 70, modifying Law 2004.166 The 
President of Argentina is enabled under the constitution to issue such an 
executive edict with legislative effect in circumstances in which there is 
insufficient time, or it is otherwise impractical to legislate though the 
 
 
160 Id. at 7. 
161 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 70. 
162 Id. 
163 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 70. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 DNU, supra note 1. 
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normal process.167 Such a decree automatically becomes law and can only 
be overturned if both chambers of the Argentine legislature oppose the 
change.168 Nevertheless, this is a tool that has been used repeatedly by 
Argentine Presidents over the last two decades, and legislative 
intervention is rare.169 Accordingly, the Decree of Necessity and Urgency 
has become a reliable means for Presidents to create national laws without 
subjecting their initiatives to normal legislative scrutiny. 
Macri’s DNU 70 is generally considered to have broken with a decade 
of rights-centered immigration policy in Argentina.170 Perhaps in 
recognition of this tradition, Macri framed the DNU in terms of human 
rights. Indeed, he cited the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
recalling that the State has the sovereign prerogative to establish criteria 
for admission and expulsion of non-citizens.171 He further recognized that 
the State must exercise that prerogative with full respect for human rights, 
and suggested that it was inconsistent with due process protections to 
subject non-citizens to lengthy immigration procedures.172 In this way, 
Macri recast the due process question in terms of timeliness rather than 
robustness of appellate review, and he made the unprecedented claim that 
lengthy immigration procedures constituted due process violations against 
immigrants.  
President Macri’s attempt to couch his decree in the language of human 
rights notwithstanding, a securitization rationale is evident in the DNU. 
The President claimed that lengthy immigration procedures also interfered 
with the enforcement of immigration laws, and therefore undermined 
national security.173 He noted that procedures intended to last 
approximately one year may last as long as seven years, enabling 
 
 
167 Art. 99.3, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (stating that “[o]nly when due to 
exceptional circumstances the ordinary procedures foreseen by this Constitution for the enactment of 
laws are impossible to be followed . . . he shall issue decrees on grounds of necessity and urgency . . . 
.”). 
168 Id. 
169 Laura Capriata, Kirchner firmó cada seis días un decreto de necesidad y urgencia, LA 
NACIÓN (April 13, 2008), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1003971-kirchner-firmo-cada-seis-dias-un-
decreto-de-necesidad-y-urgencia. 
170 See Senate Debate, Feb. 16, 2017; see also Letter from Academics and Social Scientists to 
the Senate and National Officials, Cientistas sociales convocan al Poder Legislativo a rechazar el DNU 
70/2017 que modifica las Leyes de Migraciones (No 25.871) y de Nacionalidad y Ciudadanía (No 
346) (Feb. 28, 2017), http://blogs.ffyh.unc.edu.ar/antropologia/files/2014/11/Cientistas-sociales-
rechazan-DNU-70-2017.pdf.  
171 DNU, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
172 Id. at 2. 
173 Id. (citing the timeframes established under the 2004 Law supra note 13, and arguing that an 
expulsion case would last approximately one year if an immigrant takes all administrative and judicial 
recourses available to her). 
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immigrants to prolong enforcement procedures while they take full 
advantage of all of the appeals available to them.174 Macri also cited a low 
rate of expulsion orders executed out of the total number of expulsion 
orders issued by the DNM arising from criminal convictions.175 According 
to Macri, this represented a public safety problem because there was a 
high level of criminality among immigrants.176 Specifically, he claimed 
that while immigrants only made up 4.5% of the Argentine population 
overall, they made up more than 21% of the prison population, and that 
33% of all persons incarcerated for drug crimes were immigrants.177 Macri 
justified reforming the 2004 Law though a Decree of Necessity and 
Urgency with this narrative of endemic immigrant criminality unchecked 
by an immigration system that failed to expeditiously expel criminal 
immigrants. 
Observers have offered responses both to Macri’s assumptions and his 
evidence, arguing that lengthy procedures are caused by delays on the part 
of the State, and that Macri’s statistics were manipulated to overrepresent 
the proportion of immigrants in prison.178 The following discussion, 
however, will focus on the legal provisions of the DNU, so as to 
understand what exactly Macri achieved in legal terms. The goal of this 
inquiry is to question the continued existence of a right to migrate in 
Argentina, and it will engage this question though an analysis of the extent 
to which the DNU has derogated from the norms established in the 2004 
Law and reinforced by international human rights law. The final part will 
review developments in the litigation to challenge the DNU, ongoing more 
than a year after the decree came into effect, and pending before the 
Argentine Supreme Court at the time of this writing. 
A. 2017 Decree limitations on immigrant rights  
The DNU makes a number of specific changes to the 2004 Law that 
increase the circumstances in which people will be denied residency or 
have their residency revoked, and it creates a summary expulsion 
procedure for the expulsion of certain migrants that aggravates this 
situation by making it difficult to defend the rights that remain. Notably, 
 
 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 2-3. 
177 DNU, supra note 1, Preamble. 
178 See, e.g., Senado Argentina, Comisión Bicameral Permanente de Trámite Legislativo Ley 
26.122, YOUTUBE (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yb3O7kKXtsY (comments by 
Mariela Belski); see also id. (comments by Pablo Ceriani) (Feb 16, 2017). 
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the DNU does not specifically amend the right to migrate or any of the 
provisions of the immigrant bill of rights. However, modifications to the 
procedural and judicial protections certainly affect the ability of migrants 
to defend their rights in expulsion proceedings.  
The DNU specifically addressed Macri’s concerns about immigrants’ 
disproportionate involvement in criminal activity and their ability to 
consistently evade expulsion because of extensive procedural protection. 
First, the DNU expanded categories of crimes that make migrants either 
inadmissible in the first instance or deportable after acquisition of 
residency.179 Notably, this expansion of the range of crimes that have 
immigration consequences does not require a conviction; rather, initial 
criminal enforcement proceedings are enough to deem a migrant subject to 
expulsion. The DNU also limits protection of the right to family 
reunification of such persons.180 Second, the DNU routes migrants caught 
in the new criminal immigrant dragnet into a summary expulsion 
procedure that provides a very limited opportunity to defend themselves, 
by limiting both their defenses as well as their opportunities for 
administrative and judicial review.181 The following discussion reviews the 
expansion of criminal grounds for expulsion, accompanied by a reduction 
in procedural protection. 
1. Expanded criminal grounds for expulsion 
The DNU creates very broad impediments for persons to acquire 
residency if they have any criminal activity in their past, which ostensibly 
prevents the regularization of these persons. Specifically, the DNU 
modified article 29 of the 2004 Law that sets forth the grounds for 
inadmissibility, and expanded the circumstances in which persons would 
be declared inadmissible for certain criminal activity.182 The 2004 Law 
had barred entry of persons who were convicted or otherwise criminally 
processed for trafficking in arms, drugs, or people; money laundering or 
investment in illegal activity; or any crime that is punishable under 
Argentine law with a deprivation of liberty of three years.183 Indeed, many 
of the cases discussed in the previous sections on the immigrant bill of 
rights and accompanying procedural protections concerned persons who 
 
 
179 See DNU, supra note 1, arts. 4 (substituting art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13), 6 
(substituting art. 62 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13). 
180 Id. arts. 4, 6. 
181 See DNU, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10. 
182 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13). 
183 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 29(c). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE 323  
 
 
 
 
had initially been ordered expelled under article 29 of the 2004 Law.184 
The DNU drastically expanded article 29 by making inadmissible any 
person who is convicted or otherwise criminally processed for any crime 
that is punishable with a deprivation of liberty under Argentine law.185 
Argentine criminal law provides for many offenses punishable with jail,186 
including non-violent property crimes,187 which can now lead to a denial 
of residency and expulsion under Argentine immigration law. 
Along with the expansion of the grounds for inadmissibility under 
article 29, the DNU also placed limits on the substantive rights protections 
enshrined in the 2004 Law. Specifically, while the 2004 Law included a 
waiver provision that permitted exceptions to the criminal grounds of 
inadmissibility in cases of family reunification or humanitarian concern,188 
the DNU made the waiver unavailable for persons barred for criminal 
activity punishable with three or more years in prison.189 Additionally, 
while the 2010 Regulations provided that prior crimes would not trigger 
inadmissibility under article 29 after ten years had passed,190 the DNU 
replaced the text of the article without reincorporating that protection. 
Arguably, then, the DNU eliminated this temporal limitation on the 
immigration consequences of crimes.  
The practical effect of these modifications is that a crime committed at 
any time in the past can lead to a determination of inadmissibility, without 
the consideration of any humanitarian or family-related concerns, if the 
activity was punishable by three years in prison.191 Notably, nearly all the 
cases discussed or cited in the prior discussion of the right to family unity 
involved crimes punished with three or more years in prison. For example, 
 
 
184 See supra note 123. 
185 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying art. 29 of the 2004 Law, supra note 13. 
186 See generally CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] arts. 79-313 (2011) (Arg.). 
187 CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 162 (1984) (Arg.) (providing that: “Será 
reprimido con prisión de un mes a dos años, el que se apoderare ilegítimamente de una cosa mueble, 
total o parcialmente ajena.”). 
188 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 29. 
189 DNU, supra note 1, art. 4 (modifying Article 29). 
190 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 29 (stating 
that crime would expire, or “caducar” in Spanish, according to the rules set forth in article 51 of the 
Penal Code, which provides that crimes punishable by a deprivation of liberty expire after 10 years; 
see also CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 51 (1984) (Arg.). 
191 The DNU also creates a waiver provision for informants, which allows for exceptions from 
the inadmissibility provisions for individuals who: (1) contribute to the prevention of the crime; (2) 
clarify facts that are being investigated; (3) reveal the identities of perpetrators; (4) cause a significant 
advance in an investigation; or (5) identify the whereabouts of instrumentalities or material evidence 
of the crime. See DNU, supra note 1, art. 4. It is not clear from the text of the DNU whether persons 
may benefit from this waiver even if the nature of their crime makes them ineligible for the 
humanitarian waiver. 
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Mrs. Barrios Rojas was sentenced to six years in prison for drug crimes.192 
Other cases involving three-year sentences,193 or four-year sentences,194 
also stand out as examples of cases in which courts overturned decisions 
by the DNM to deny a family reunification waiver. Not only does the new 
DNU regime contemplate the expulsion of migrants in this exact 
circumstance, but Mrs. Barrios Rojas and others could now be subject to 
cancelation of their residency under the DNU. 
Indeed, the DNU also modified provisions of the 2004 Law that 
prescribed certain conduct that would trigger a cancelation of residency. 
The 2004 Law provided grounds for the cancelation of residency that 
overlapped in some measure with the grounds for inadmissibility,195 
 
 
192 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Sala V, 31/03/2015, 
“Barrios Rojas, Zoyla Cristina c. En-DNM Resol 561/11 (exp. 2091169/06(805462/95)) y otro / 
recurso directo para juzgados,” https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BR,%20ZC.pdf; see 
also Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of Salta], 
13/3/2015, “Cerruto Baleriano c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación – Dirección Naciónal de 
Migraciones / Amparo Ley 18.986,” https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/C,%20B.pdf 
(finding that Bolivian woman convicted of six years and five months should not be expelled on 
account of her three Argentina children, husband and mother, all of whom resided in Argentina). 
193 See, e.g., Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 3 [1a Inst.] [Federal 
Administrative Litigation Court], 21/9/2015, “Encomenderos Noriega, Walter Luis c. En-M Interior-
DNM-DISP 2358/10 (expte. 225826/01) / Recurso Directo DNM,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/EN,%20WL.pdf (finding that a Peruvian man 
sentenced to three years for identity fraud should not be expelled because the man had most of his 
family in Argentina, he had no close family left in Peru, he had reformed his behavior after relase from 
jail, and had obtained a steady job); Juzgado en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 8 [1a Inst.] 
[Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 2/5/2016, “Benavides Aguilar, Mabel Leidy y Otro c. En-M 
Interior-RSL 1072/11-DNM-RSL87560/09 (expt. 242169/08) / Recurso Directo DNM,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/BA,%20ML.pdf (finding that a Peruvian woman 
sentenced to three years in prison for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the fact that 
she was pregnant and currently lived with her boyfriend and his parents, and that her parents and 
siblings also lived in Argentina). 
194 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Salta [CFed. Salta] [Federal Court of Appeals of 
Salta], 9/3/2015, “Franco Herhuay, David Santiago c. Ministerio del Interior de la Nación-Dirección 
Nacional de Migraciones s/ Impugnación de Acto Administrativo,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/FH,%20DS.pdf (finding that a man sentenced to four 
years and eight months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on account of the negative impact 
that expulsion would have on his three Argentine daughters); Juzgado en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo Federal No. 5 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative Litigation Court], 12/8/2015, “C.C.R. 
c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11-DNM (expte 808848/08) / Recurso Directo Para Juzgados,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(JCAF).pdf;  Cámara de Apelaciones 
en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal Court of Appeals in Administrative 
Litigation], sala I, 1/9/2016, “C.C.R. c. EN-M Interior-Resol 715/11-DNM (expte 308848/08) / 
Recurso Directo Para Juzgados,” 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CC,%20R%20(CNACAF).pdf (finding that a 
Bolivian woman sentenced to four years and six months for drug trafficking should not be expelled on 
account of her Argentine husband and the child they had together). 
195 See, e.g., The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 62(e) (expressly incorporating Article 29(d) and 
(e) ground for inadmissibility as grounds for cancelation of residency). 
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providing for such cancelation where a resident was convicted of a crime 
and sentenced to five or more years of imprisonment, or was convicted of 
repeated criminal offenses.196 The 2004 Law included some important 
legal protections in this regard. First, it required immigration authorities to 
wait two years after the completion of the sentence before canceling 
residency.197 Second, it provided immigration authorities with a thirty-day 
window to initiate the cancelation proceeding, or forfeit the right to do 
so.198 The 2004 Law also included a provision that waived the cancelation 
of residency of a parent, child, or spouse of an Argentine citizen, unless 
immigration authorities are able to provide support for their decision under 
the law.199 In essence, the 2004 Law protected migrants from cancelation 
of their residency by requiring that the conduct that triggered cancelation 
be egregious, by placing the onus on the State to initiate the cancelation 
procedure in a tight timeframe, and by including a generous protection for 
families. 
The DNU substantially alters all of these protections and creates a 
framework that greatly facilitates the cancelation of immigrants’ 
residency. First, the DNU provides that any crime, committed in Argentina 
or abroad, that may be punished with a deprivation of liberty under 
Argentine law, will trigger a cancelation of residency.200 Further, the DNU 
provides that the conviction of such a crime will automatically cancel the 
residency, no matter how long the immigrant has held the residency, and 
that expulsion will automatically follow.201 Finally, the DNU limits the 
extent to which an immigrant can challenge their expulsion on family 
reunification grounds by creating a limited waiver.202 The waiver 
limitations are threefold: (1) it is only available to a person whose 
sentence does not exceed three years; (2) it may only be invoked if the 
family relationship is to a parent, child or spouse; and (3) it is unavailable 
if the person has withdrawn financial support for the relevant family 
member.203 
The provisions of the DNU both limit the possibility for certain 
 
 
196 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 62(b). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 DNU, supra note 1, art. 6 (creating a new Article 62(c)). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. While the DNU emphasizes that this is the only waiver for the expulsion of criminal 
immigrants, it does provide a fail-safe in stating that such expulsion may not violate the national law 
on refugee protection. Id. (referencing Law 26.165 on the protection of refugees). 
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immigrants to regularize their situation, and limit the recourse against 
immigration restrictions based on family ties. Moreover, there exists a 
connection between the harshening of legal provisions that govern the 
admission and residence of migrants, and a new summary expulsion 
procedure that was created by the DNU. 
2. The procedure for summary expulsion 
The extent of the procedural modifications made by the DNU is quite 
staggering, and when read together they largely nullify the 2004 Law’s 
protections for persons against whom criminal proceedings have been 
initiated. As an initial matter, the DNU provides that all decisions about 
the limited family reunification or humanitarian waivers mentioned above 
belong to immigration authorities, and there is no recourse to the courts in 
the event that such waivers are denied.204 Indeed, the DNU goes as far as 
to strip the judiciary of the competency to waive the provisions of the law 
that deny admission or cancel the residency of anyone who has engaged in 
criminal activity that could be punished with jail.205 This makes the 
discretionary power of the immigration authorities in such cases nearly 
complete, and harkens back to the Videla Law era.  
The effects of this jurisdiction stripping provision are substantial. 
Indeed, the majority of cases reviewed in the sections above on the 
immigrant bill of rights and judicial and procedural protections concerned 
a decision not to waive grounds for inadmissibility for family reunification 
or humanitarian reasons.206 Accordingly, under the new DNU regime, 
these cases would have resulted in expulsion. In fact, all of the migrants 
who obtained their residency in those cases could now have cancelation of 
residency proceedings initiated against them, and the exact same criminal 
grounds that were waived previously under judicial review would not be 
subject to review under the new regime. 
Perhaps the most significant change to the procedural protections in the 
2004 Law was the DNU’s addition of a new chapter establishing a 
“special summary migration procedure.”207 The scope of the summary 
expulsion procedure is broad, in that it applies to all cases of 
inadmissibility, and most cases of cancelation of residency, and in 
 
 
204 DNU, supra note 1, art. 7. 
205 Id.; but see supra note 203 (referencing Law 26.165 on the protection of refugees). 
206 See cases cited supra note 123. 
207 DNU, supra note 1, art. 9 (creating Chapter I Bis of Title V, and titling the new chapter: “Del 
Procedimiento Migratorio Especial Sumarismo”).  
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particular those arising from criminal provisions.208  
This new procedure, that will provide the framework for the vast 
majority of expulsion proceedings in Argentina moving forward, delivers 
on its promise of summary consideration. Indeed, once a proceeding 
initiates to exclude or expel an immigrant, such person has three days to 
request information from the government in order to prepare a defense, 
and just two days if the government decides to detain the person.209 The 
DNU provides an additional three days to review the charges against the 
immigrant.210 After the passage of these deadlines, the immigration officer 
decides the case, and if it is an adverse decision, the DNU provides just 
three days to make an administrative appeal to immigration authorities.211 
Once the appeal is resolved, or the three-day deadline for appeal expires, 
the administrative process concludes.212 Notably, the DNU prohibits the 
extension of any of these deadlines.213 
To the extent that an adverse decision may be appealed to the 
judiciary,214 the law provides three days to file an appeal with the DNM, 
which then has three days to forward the appeal and its response to the 
appropriate court.215 The court of first instance has one day to determine 
whether the case has been appropriately filed, and may reject the case for 
want of jurisdiction as a preliminary matter.216 After jurisdiction is 
established, the court of first instance has three days to issue a final 
decision.217 An adverse decision by the court of first instance must be 
appealed to the appropriate appeals court in three days, and the appeals 
court has three days to issue its own decision in the case.218 The appeals 
court decision is final, as motions to reconsider or further appeals are 
prohibited.219 
 
 
208 DNU, supra note 1, art. 10 (including in the scope all grounds of inadmissibility in Articles 
29(a)-(k), and cancelation of residency Articles 62(a), (b), (c), and (f), which are the provisions 
relating to immigration fraud and all criminal bases for cancellation). 
209 DNU, supra note 1, art. 12 (establishing Article 69 ter., which sets forth timeframes for 
documents request in subsections (a)-(c)). 
210 DNU, supra note 1, art. 13. 
211 DNU, supra note 1, art. 14. 
212 Id. 
213 DNU, supra note 1, art. 10. 
214 As discussed above, the DNU strips the judiciary of the competency to waive the provisions 
of the law that deny admission or cancel the residency of anyone who has engaged in criminal activity 
that could be punished with jail, therefore these matters are not appealable. See supra note 205. 
215 DNU, supra note 1, art. 16. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 DNU, supra note 1, art. 18. 
219 DNU, supra note 1, art. 19; see also DNU, supra note 1, art. 26 (deleting the provision for 
reconsideration from the 2004 Law. supra note 13). 
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While the DNU retains the right to counsel at the expense of the State 
on its face, it places the burden on the immigrant in expulsion proceedings 
to request an attorney.220 The DNU further dictates whether someone 
qualifies for counsel at the expense of the State, and if a case is referred to 
the public defender’s office, the DNU provides the defense lawyer three 
days to respond to the charges in the expulsion proceeding.221 
In addition to substantially speeding up expulsion procedures, and 
limiting procedural protections as a matter of fact and law, the DNU 
loosens restrictions on immigration detention. First, the DNU extends the 
allowable period of post-order detention from a maximum of thirty 
days,222 to thirty days renewable by judicial order for thirty-day periods, 
and without a firm outward limit.223 Further, the DNU limits the family 
reunification fail-safe against detention,224 by referring such claims back 
into the limited waiver procedures created by the DNU and described 
above.225 
Subtler, though equally troubling, is the evident encouragement in the 
DNU for the expanded use of detention before an expulsion order is final. 
Indeed, while the DNU retains the language that pre-order detention 
should be “exceptional,” it provides that immigration authorities may seek 
detention at the initiation of the summary expulsion procedure in order to 
facilitate the ultimate execution of the expulsion order.226 This 
simultaneously communicates the idea that expulsion is inevitable in such 
summary proceedings, and that detention is an important tool to ensure 
this outcome. It further emphasizes that the DNM may make a detention 
request at any point in an administrative or judicial proceeding.227 Finally, 
the DNU provides that that the DNM may seek the detention of an 
immigrant in the context of the review of the expulsion order before a 
court, and that it need not initiate a separate proceeding to authorize 
detention.228  
Immigrant rights advocates expressed alarm at the passage of the DNU, 
manifesting concerns about the President’s demonization of immigrants, 
 
 
220 DNU, supra note 1, art. 24. 
221 Id. 
222 Decree 616/2010, Regulation of Law No. 25.871, May 3, 2010, [318989] B.O. art. 70 
(allowing for a judicial detention order of fifteen days to carry out an expulsion, which was renewable 
one time for fifteen days). 
223 DNU, supra note 1, art. 21.  
224 The 2004 Law, supra note 13, art. 70. 
225 DNU, supra note 1, art. 21. 
226 DNU, supra note 1, art. 11. 
227 Id. 
228 DNU, supra note 1, art. 17. 
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as well as the substantial reduction in legal protections for migrants.229 
One group of rights advocates filed a collective action challenging the 
legality of the DNU, which has provided a framework to think about the 
widespread changes that are under way.230 
B. Litigation to challenge the 2017 Decree 
As provided in the Argentine Constitution, the legislative debate on the 
DNU began in earnest within weeks of its issuance,231 but the legislature 
did not conclude the debate nor did it take a final vote on the Decree. 
Recognizing the absence of political will, prominent civil society 
organizations (“petitioners”) in Argentina filed a legal challenge against 
the Decree,232 arguing that it violated the Argentine Constitution and 
human rights treaty obligations with constitutional hierarchy.233 The 
petitioners argued that the DNU exceeded the limits of presidential power 
defined by the constitution,234 and that the DNU interfered with access to 
justice and the right to a defense,235 impeded access to free legal counsel at 
the expense of the State,236 and violated the right to family reunification.237 
First, the petitioners argued that the Supreme Court had interpreted the 
constitution to permit a decree of necessity and urgency only when: (1) it 
is impossible for the legislature to convene, or (2) “exceptional 
circumstances” require immediate action that cannot be accomplished 
through the regular legislative process.238 With regard to the justification 
provided by the President for the DNU, the petitioners argued that the 
President’s comparison of the percentage of immigrants in Argentina 
(4.5%) with the percentage of immigrants in federal penitentiaries for drug 
crimes (33%) was misleading.239 They argued that it was more appropriate 
to consider the entire population of people jailed for violations of the 
 
 
229 See infra, Sec. III.b. 
230 See infra, Sec. III.b. 
231 See, e.g., Senado Argentina, Comisión Bicameral Permanente de Trámite Legislativo Ley 
26.11, supra note 178. 
232 The petitioners included the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Comision 
Argentina para los Refugiados y Migrantes (CAREF), and Colectivo por la Diversidad (COPADI). See 
Amparo Colectivo contra Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia (DNU) 70/2017 [hereinafter Collective 
Action] (on file with author) (translation by author).  
233 Collective Action §§ VIII-XII.   
234 See id. § VII.1.a 
235 See id. § VIII - IX.  
236 See id. § VIII. 
237 See id. § XI. 
238 See id. § VII.1.a. 
239 See id.  
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controlled substances law,240 including both provincial and federal 
facilities, and that the immigrants represented only 17% of that carceral 
population.241 Further, they highlighted that immigrants made up only 6% 
of the entire carceral population, without regard for the crime at issue.242 
The petitioners argued that by presenting the statistics he did, President 
Macri intended to misrepresent the nature of the alleged problem of 
immigrant criminality in order to justify his emergency use of the 
exceptional power bestowed on his office by the Argentine Constitution.243 
Another argument focused on the constitution’s prohibition against 
using the decree of necessity and urgency in matters concerning criminal 
law,244 taxes,245 or elections and political parties.246 Specifically, the 
petitioners argued that the expansion of criminal grounds for expulsion 
created a situation in which a person who served time for a crime could 
then be deprived of their liberty for an immigration infraction for an 
extended period of time in relation to the prior crime.247 By extending the 
criminal law punishment through expulsion and detention, the petitioners 
argued that the DNU modified criminal law and therefore should declared 
invalid as violative of the constitution.248 
Next, the petitioners argued that the DNU violated minimum standards 
of due process and access to justice by imposing a summary expulsion 
procedure that violated fundamental rights to adequate procedure and 
freedom from arbitrary detention.249 Specifically, they argued that the 
short timeframes in which migrants were expected to prepare and present a 
defense against expulsion created an “illusory” process, inasmuch as it 
would be impossible for any migrant to respond adequately in the time 
provided.250 Further, petitioners argued that this summary expulsion 
procedure was accompanied by increased authority to subject migrants to 
preventative detention in violation of their right to freedom of 
 
 
240 Law No. 23737, Oct. 11, 1989, [26737] B.O. 4 (Arg.) amends the penal code and sets forth a 
wide variety of controlled substances crimes and the punishments for those crimes. 
241 See Collective Action, supra note 233, § VII.1.a.  
242 See id.  
243 See id.  
244 See id. § VII.2. 
245 See id. § VII.3.  
246 See id. § VII.2.a.  
247 See id. § VII.2.b. 
248 See id. § VII.2.c (suggesting that the distinction between the migratory policy and the 
criminal sections appears hazy). 
249 See id. § VIII. 
250 See id. § VIII.1. 
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movement.251 Moreover, they argued that the restrictions on access to 
counsel, administrative review, and judicial review aggravated this 
problem and unduly limited access to justice.252 
The petitioners further argued that limitations on the right to counsel 
violated basic legal protections.253 Specifically, they identified provisions 
that required a migrant to explicitly request publicly provided counsel, and 
demonstrate their economic need in order to secure counsel.254 In the event 
that the immigrant does not expressly request counsel and/or fails to prove 
sufficient economic necessity to warrant assigned counsel, the time 
continues to run on the procedural deadlines, leaving them at grave risk of 
missing their opportunity to challenge an expulsion order.255 Under the 
2004 Law, all procedural deadlines were suspended until the defense 
counsel entered an appearance,256 whereas by shifting the burden onto the 
immigrant to invoke a right to counsel and prove a need, the DNU 
virtually assured that poor migrants would go without counsel.257 
Finally, the petitioners highlighted with grave concern limits that the 
DNU placed on the right to family reunification.258 They highlighted that 
the 2004 law itself protected the right to family reunification, and that this 
right under the law was reinforced by various international human rights 
obligations.259 By denying many migrants in expulsion proceedings the 
ability to allege family reunification as a means to acquire residency, or 
for courts to review these arguments on appeal, the DNU left this 
fundamental right to the discretion of immigration officials.260 This 
process was further burdened by additional requirements to demonstrate 
qualifying familial relationships.261 
Later that year, Federal Prosecutor Miguel A. Gilligan exercised his 
authority to issue an advisory opinion on the matter.262 In it, Gilligan 
responded to each of the petitioners’ arguments in turn. First, he concluded 
 
 
251 See id. § X.  
252 See id. § VIII.1–3. 
253 See id. § VIII.3. 
254 See id.  
255 See id.  
256 See id. 
257 See id.  
258 See Collective Action, supra note 233, § XI. 
259 See id.  
260 See id.  
261 See id.  
262 Advisory Opinion of Miguel A. Gilligan, Federal Prosecutor, National Public Ministry, on 
“Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN (expte. no. 3061/2017) / Amparo Ley 16.986, 
Juzgado No. 1, Secretaria No. 1, (Sept. 19 2017), https://www.fiscales.gob.ar/fiscalias/pidieron-que-
se-declare-la-inconstitucionalidad-parcial-del-dnu-que-modifico-la-ley-de-migraciones/. 
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that the DNU was not barred by the criminal law exception,263 and then 
that it did meet the standard for “necessity and urgency.”264 Second, with 
regard to the substance of the DNU, he identified the need to identify 
those rights that were appropriately vindicated though a collective legal 
challenge of this nature.265 He found that issues relating to access to 
justice, such as the procedural alterations and the right to a defense, were 
collective,266 while issues concerning the right to family reunification and 
freedom from arbitrary detention were individual, and not appropriately 
raised in this litigation.267  
Gilligan went on to examine the due process and judicial protection 
challenges raised in the litigation.268 He provided an extensive discussion 
of the international human rights obligations that bind Argentina, in 
particular articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.269 He emphasized State obligations to eliminate obstacles to a 
defense,270 provide adequate time to prepare a defense,271 and ensure 
sufficient time to collect evidence to support a case.272 Gilligan concluded 
that the three-day deadline for both the administrative and judicial appeals 
and the requirement that a migrant invoke her right to counsel violated 
Argentina’s human rights obligations.273 
In October 2017, the trial court issued its decision on the collective 
action against the DNU, rejecting all of the petitioners’ arguments except 
one.274 First, the court agreed with Gilligan that the challenges to the 
family reunification provisions were matters that must be taken up in 
individual cases, and therefore declined to address the merits of those 
claims.275 Second, the court found that the DNU was not prohibited under 
the criminal law exclusion, and further said that it was still under 
consideration by the Senate, which was the appropriate body to determine 
 
 
263 Id. at 28. 
264 Id. at 34. 
265 Id. at 38. 
266 Id. at 43. 
267 Id. at 47-48. 
268 Id. at 49-72. 
269 Id. at 56. 
270 Id. at 53. 
271 Id. at 54-55. 
272 Id. at 55. 
273 Id. at 59, 69-70. 
274 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 1 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative 
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo 
Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017),” 
https://www.diariojudicial.com/public/documentos/000/075/903/000075903.pdf. 
275 Id. at 3-4. 
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whether it was duly issued.276  
Third, the court specifically disagreed with Gilligan and found the 
summary expulsion procedure and the detention provisions of the DNU to 
be reasonable and consistent with Argentina’s obligations under 
international law.277 With regard to the summary expulsion procedure, the 
court emphasized that nothing in human rights law contradicted the 
sovereign right of Argentina to regulate the entry and exit of non-citizens 
into its territory.278 In terms of whether the process set forth in the DNU 
was too abbreviated, the court found that it was not when compared to 
other speedy judicial measures under Argentine law.279 With regard to the 
detention provisions, the court understood the need for detention in order 
to effectuate expulsion, and found that the time limits and judicial 
protections established in the DNU were reasonable.280 
Finally, the court took up the petitioners’ argument regarding the DNU 
requirement that a migrant in expulsion proceedings invoke her right to 
counsel at the expense of the State. The court emphasized that Argentina 
has the clear obligation to guarantee defense counsel to indigent migrants, 
and that it was highly unlikely that it could meet this obligation in the 
summary expulsion procedure without specifically informing the migrant 
of her right to counsel.281 Accordingly, the court ordered that the DNU 
should be modified to require the State to inform any indigent migrant 
facing expulsion or cancelation of residency of her right to counsel 
provided by the State.282 
The petitioners appealed the decision of the trial court to a chamber of 
the administrative appeals court, and received an opinion that vindicated 
all of their claims.283 Three appeals court judges issued separate opinions, 
each validating some of the petitioners’ arguments, and together nullifying 
the DNU as unconstitutional.  
First, Judge Jorge Federico Alemany found error in the trial court’s 
decision that the DNU’s provisions on summary expulsion, detention, and 
family reunification did not violate the constitution. Judge Alemany first 
 
 
276 Id. at 7. 
277 Id. at 12 (finding on summary expulsion procedure), 15 (finding on detention). 
278 Id. at 12. 
279 Id. (referencing habeas corpus, the amparo action, and a summary criminal procedure).  
280 Id. at 14-15. 
281 Id. at 16. 
282 Id. at 16, 17-18. 
283 Cámara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal 
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. 
EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf. 
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found that the three-day deadline for submitting administrative and 
judicial appeals was insufficient to guarantee the fundamental due process 
rights.284 Next, the Judge found that the new detention framework 
permitted detention for the duration of expulsion proceedings, which 
violated protections against arbitrary detention.285 Finally, the Judge found 
that the DNU’s jurisdiction stripping provisions that prevented the review 
of the DNM’s decision to deny family reunification waivers violated 
clearly established human rights protections.286 
Second, Judge Guillermo F. Tracey found error in the trial court’s 
decision that the DNU met the constitutional standard for “necessity and 
urgency.” The Judge began by elaborating the constitutional standard for 
exceptional circumstances that justified the issuance of legislation without 
congressional action.287 The Judge then reviewed the factual allegations 
set forth in the DNU that expulsion proceedings were not leading to actual 
expulsions, and that immigrants were overrepresented in the carceral 
population in Argentina.288 The Judge then reviewed official government 
statistics, and found not only that there had been no increase in the 
proportion of non-citizen inmates, but that the percentage of immigrants in 
prison had actually dropped in 2016.289 The Judge concluded that the DNU 
failed to meet the constitutional standard for “necessity and urgency.”290 
The third judge, Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, joined the opinion of Judge 
Treacy, providing a majority that declared the DNU unconstitutional 
because it failed to provide the requisite exceptional circumstances that 
permit the President to legislate under the constitution.291 Judge Gallegos 
further elaborated his perspective, not shared by the other two judges, that 
the DNU should be declared unconstitutional pursuant to the subject 
matter limitation on decrees that modify criminal law.292 Summary 
expulsion proceedings conducted while a person was detained, he 
reasoned, were administrative sanctions analogous to criminal punishment 
and therefore inappropriate matters to regulate through a decree of 
necessity and urgency.293 
 
 
284 Id. voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. X. 
285 Id. sec. XI. 
286 Id. sec. XII. 
287 Id. voto Judge Guillermo F. Treacy, sec. V.2. 
288 Id. sec. V.4. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. voto Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, sec. I. 
292 Id. sec. V. 
293 Id. 
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All three appeals court judges relied heavily on international human 
rights law and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,294 as had the trial court judge295 and Macri himself in issuing the 
DNU.296 It is evident from the litigation thus far that human rights law will 
be of fundamental importance in resolving any challenge to the DNU. 
Moreover, as expulsions continue to take place under the auspices of the 
DNU during the pendency of the Supreme Court appeal, individuals must 
challenge the application of the Decree in their cases as violations of the 
right to family reunification, protections again arbitrary detention, and 
other procedural violations. The DNU has undoubtedly cast a shadow over 
the right to migrate in Argentina, but core human rights protections may 
yet serve to reinforce this concept and defend the immigrant rights 
achievements of the last decade. 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS REINFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE 
The essence of the paradigm shift that occurred in Argentina with the 
right to migrate is best captured by the cases of unauthorized migrants at 
the border who were released from detention and provided with a lawyer 
and time to regularize their status.297 The DNU regime places such 
migrants directly into summary expulsion procedure and facilitates the 
decision to detain them while the expulsion orders issue, and thus could 
easily be considered to have ended the era of the right to migrate. It is still 
too early, however, to write the obituary of this novel right, and while 
signs point towards the hardening of Argentina immigration enforcement, 
a legal framework for the protection of the right to migrate is still available 
to Argentine courts. 
Most notably, the prominence of international human rights protections 
under Argentine law inspires hope for the perseverance of right to migrate. 
However, while human rights law conceptualizes rights as inherent to the 
human person, and limits state action with regard to such rights, a well-
established norm of international law guarantees states authority to create 
 
 
294 Id. at 6, 47-49. 
295 Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo Federal No. 1 [1a Inst.] [Federal Administrative 
Litigation Court], 18/10/2017, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. EN-DNM / Amparo 
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rules to regulate entry and exit from their national territory. Indeed, Macri 
cited this principle in the opening considerations of the DNU, as did the 
trial court and the court of appeals in the DNU litigation.298 While Macri 
overstated the support that international human rights law provides for his 
DNU, it is important to recognize a tension in international human rights 
law at the outset of this analysis. 
This tension is present in the very foundational documents that 
establish the universal and regional systems of human rights that bind 
Argentina. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration) and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (American Declaration)299 leave states wide latitude in matters of 
immigration regulation by articulating the freedom of movement as the 
rights to circulate within a state, leave a state, and enter one’s own state–
notably excluding any right of entry into any other state.300 Similarly, the 
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals 
of the Country in Which They Live sets forth broad human rights 
protections for migrants,301 but prefaces those protections with the 
following: 
Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing the 
illegal entry into and presence in a State of any alien, nor shall any 
provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to 
promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and 
the terms and conditions of their stay or to establish differences 
between nationals and aliens . . .302  
While it is true that these foundational human rights documents suggest 
that the protections they articulate will not limit sovereign authority in 
matters of immigration regulation, a number of important norms of 
 
 
298 See cases cited supra notes 274, 283. 
299 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)  
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
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300 Universal Declaration, supra note 299, art. 13 (stating specifically that: “(1) [e]veryone has 
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state;” and “(2) [e]veryone 
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protection have evolved in human rights law. The two sections that follow 
will explore immigrant rights norms that protect family life from arbitrary 
state interference and guarantee due process, and judicial protection in the 
context of immigration regulation and enforcement. Each of these 
protections is enshrined in Argentine law in a variety of ways, and they 
represent some of the clearest lines of defense of the right to migrate. 
A. Defending the right to family reunification 
The protection of the family is prominent in the Universal Declaration, 
which established both the right to create a family, and the imperative to 
protect the family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of 
society.”303 In the immigration context, the right to family life provides 
both the basis for a right to migrate for purposes of family reunification as 
well a family unity defense against the expulsion of migrants, and 
therefore limits state authority with regard to the regulation of entry and 
residence of migrants.304 The right to family life was reiterated in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),305 and the 
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) has interpreted that right as including 
“the adoption of appropriate measures . . . to ensure the unity or 
reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated 
for political, economic or similar reasons.”306 The HRC has extended this 
protection to the immigration context, announcing limits on state 
discretion over the terms of entry and residence of migrants.307 
Specifically, the HRC has resolved a number of individual cases 
involving the right to family life as a defense against expulsion.308 
 
 
303 Universal Declaration, supra note 299, art. 16; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 
299, art. 12 (providing that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”). 
304 Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons Under General International Law–
Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 41-42, (Vincent Chetail ed., 2014). 
305 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 17, 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
306 39th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 19: art. 23 (The Family) 
Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses, ¶ 5 (July 27, 1990). 
307 27th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens 
Under the Covenant, ¶ 5 (Apr. 11, 1986) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15] (stating that “[t]he 
Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party . . . . 
However, in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation 
to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of . . . respect for family life arise”). 
308 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana, 
CCPR/C/98/D/1246/2004 (2010); UN Human Rights Committee, Dauphin v. Canada, A/64/40 vol. II, 
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Examples drawn from the Western Hemisphere are particularly telling. In 
Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana, the HRC found that Guyana’s refusal to 
process a Cuban citizen’s marriage-based naturalization due to potential 
political repercussions in the bilateral relations between the two countries 
constituted a violation of the right to family life.309 In Dauphin v. Canada, 
the HRC concluded that the expulsion of a Haitian man, who had lived in 
Canada since the age of two and whose parents and siblings were all 
Canadian citizens,310 constituted a violation of the right to family life, 
notwithstanding a conviction for robbery with violence which earned him 
a thirty-three month sentence.311  
The American Declaration mirrors the Universal Declaration in its 
protections of the family, including the right to form a family,312 as well as 
a protection against abusive attacks by the state against the family.313 In 
Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, the Inter-
American Commission found that these obligations under the American 
Declaration constrained the authority of the United States to expel 
individuals from its territory.314 The Inter-American Commission relied, in 
part, on the authority of the HRC referenced above, as well as the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,315 in concluding 
that the United States was required to consider the effects of expulsion on 
the families of Mr. Smith and Mr. Armendariz.316 Where the United States 
had failed to consider these effects, due to drug crimes committed by Mr. 
Smith and Mr. Armendariz, the Commission found that it had violated 
 
 
Annex VII.SS 427 (2009); UN Human Rights Committee, Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No. 
1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (2004). 
309 UN Human Rights Committee, Gonzalez v. Republic of Guyana, CCPR/C/98/D/1246/2004 
(2010) ¶ 14.4 (2010). 
310 UN Human Rights Committee, Dauphin v. Canada, A/64/40 vol. II, Annex VII.SS ¶ 8.2 
(2009). 
311 Id. ¶ 9. Similarly, the HRC found that the expulsion of an Italian man who had overstayed his 
tourist visa in Australia and married an Australian citizen and had four children would violate his right 
to family life, even though he had a criminal conviction in Italy that led to a conclusion that he had 
“bad character.” UN Human Rights Commission, Madafferi v. Australia, Communication No. 
1011/2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 ¶¶ 2.1-2.4, 9.8 (2004). 
312 American Declaration, supra note 299, art. VI (establishing that “[e]very person has the right 
to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection thereof”). 
313 American Declaration, supra note 299, art. V (establishing that “[e]very person has the right 
to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and 
family life”). 
314 Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.  Comm’n 
H.R., Report N. 81/10 (2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp. 
315 Id. ¶¶ 52-54. 
316 Id. ¶ 60. 
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each man’s human right to family life and judicial protection.317 The 
Commission further considered the children left behind when the United 
States expelled Mr. Smith and Mr. Armendariz, and found the United 
States had violated its obligation to consider the best interests of the 
child.318 
The strength of the protection of family life is arguably at its apex 
when the interests of children are concerned. The main UN instrument in 
this regard is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), which 
sets forth the principles that a child should not be separated from her 
family against her will, unless it is in her best interest.319 The CRC 
expounds on this right with reference to “applications by a child or his or 
her parents to enter or leave a State Party for purposes of family 
reunification,” and requires that such requests are dealt with in a “positive, 
humane, and expeditious manner.”320 While this guarantee is procedural in 
nature, it suggests favorable treatment of such requests. Moreover, the 
near universal ratification of this instrument suggests that such principles 
may be on their way to attaining the status of customary international 
law.321 In fact, some scholars have argued that a customary norm exists to 
facilitate the reunification of a nuclear family of documented migrants.322 
In its Advisory Opinion 21 (“AO-21”), the Inter-American Court 
provided guidance on the specific question of the scope of protection for 
children in cases in which one or both parents might be subjected to 
expulsion due to their migratory status.323 In that opinion, the court began 
with a conceptual clarification that it understands family to encompass 
more than a child’s parents for purposes of protection under the right to 
family unity, and that a State has the obligation to determine the 
composition of a child’s family unit in each case.324 The court 
acknowledged the tension that exists between the State’s right to regulate 
 
 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
320 Id. art. 10(1).  
321 Chetail, supra note 304, at 46. 
322 Id. at 43. While this position is certainly contested, more have coalesced around the 
proposition that a state is required to reunite a minor child with her family legally residing in a state’s 
territory. Id. at 44. 
323 Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration And/or in Need of 
International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 21, ¶ 263 (Aug. 
19, 2014) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-21/14] (specifically reviewing this question with 
reference to Articles 8, 17, 19 and 25 of the American Convention and Articles VI and XXV of the 
American Declaration). 
324 Id. ¶ 272. 
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entry and exit of non-citizens and it obligations to afford special protection 
to children, and emphasized that every exercise of the State’s right must 
comply with the requirements of (a) suitability; (b) necessity, and (c) 
proportionality.325  
Specifically with regards to proportionality, the court indicated that 
because it will never be in the best interest of a child to be separated from 
her parent through expulsion, “the State concerned has the obligation to 
weigh, adequately and strictly, the protection of the family unit against the 
legitimate interests of the State.”326 Among other considerations, the court 
requires a state to weigh: (a) the duration of stay and extent of ties of the 
person to be expelled; (b) the nationality, residency, and custody of the 
child if expulsion takes place; (c) the scope of harm to the family unit; and 
(d) the scope of disruption to the child’s daily life.327 Importantly, the 
court found that in cases where a child is a citizen or permanent resident of 
the host country, “it is axiomatic that the child must conserve the right to 
continue enjoying her or his family life in said country and, as a 
component of this, mutual enjoyment of the cohabitation of parents and 
children.”328 The court concluded that: 
[T]he rupture of the family unit by the expulsion of one or both 
parents due to a breach of immigration laws related to entry or 
permanence is disproportionate in these situations, because the 
sacrifice inherent in the restriction of the right to family life, which 
may have repercussions on the life and development of the child, 
appears unreasonable or excessive in relation to the advantages 
obtained by forcing the parent to leave the territory because of an 
administrative offense.329 
In perhaps the most progressive interpretation of a child’s right to 
family life, the court found expulsion of one or both parents for 
immigration violations per se unreasonable where a child is a national or a 
permanent resident of the country. Inasmuch as countries throughout 
North and South America have adopted birthright nationality in their 
national constitutions, this Inter-American Court rule creates a broad 
limitation on States’ authority to expel non-citizens in the Americas. 
The standards described in the preceding paragraphs strongly suggest 
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that the DNU violates the well-articulated protections of family life and 
the best interests of the child under Inter-American and UN human rights 
law. Most specifically, the provision of the DNU that makes people 
inadmissible when they make a request for residency if they have 
committed a crime punishable with jail, and only makes a waiver available 
to immigrants who have been sentenced to less than three years, violates 
this protection. Perhaps a dozen cases published by courts throughout 
Argentina and discussed in the first section of this Article concern the 
cases of irregular migrants who have lived many years in Argentina, 
established families, and raised Argentine children. All of those cases 
would trigger the inadmissibility ground that the DNU incorporated into 
article 29. Many of them would not be eligible for the family unity waiver 
due to the fact that their sentences exceeded three years. If Argentina 
applies the DNU to these cases, it will certainly violate its human rights 
obligations under the American Convention as elaborated by the Inter-
American Court. 
This same analysis applies in the cases of cancelation of residency, but 
the likely outcome in those cases under the DNU is even more troubling. 
That is because cancelation of residency proceedings could be initiated 
under the DNU against all of the respondents from the cases referenced in 
the previous paragraph. As a matter of law under the DNU, certain people 
who were granted a waiver to protect their right to family unity five or ten 
years ago would be ineligible for such a waiver now, and their expulsion 
would be mandatory. Notably, the decisions of many of those courts were 
firmly rooted in human rights protections as incorporated into Argentine 
law. Therefore, the President was certainly on notice that he was issuing 
an edict that brought Argentina directly into conflict with its international 
treaty obligations.  
The collective action challenging the DNU raised this problem. The 
trial court believed that the right to family reunification would be more 
appropriately addressed through individual cases, reasoning that it was an 
individual right that requires an analysis of the individual circumstances of 
each case.330 This failed to appreciate the rules of law established by the 
Inter-American Commission and Court, which have found that simply 
receiving a three-year sentence could never be grievous enough to justify 
the incursion into the right of an Argentine child to be unified with her 
parents.331 The minority opinion of the appeals court Judge Alemany more 
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faithfully incorporated international human rights law on this point,332 but 
this is still very much an open question in the DNU litigation.  
If the Supreme Court does not resolve this systematic violation of non-
citizens’ right to family life and special protections for children, then the 
individual litigation suggested by the trial court will be the only remaining 
avenue. In order to effectively pursue this avenue, it will be necessary to 
also challenge the restrictions on judicial protection implemented by the 
DNU, which remain in place during the pendency of the appeal.  
B. Restoring due process and judicial protection 
International human rights law also articulates important protections in 
terms of due process and judicial protection. International human rights 
bodies have often developed these norms in conjunction with substantive 
human rights protections including, for example, the right to family life. 
Indeed, respect for family life in the immigration context requires 
procedures for balancing the equities of a non-citizen’s life against the 
authority of the State to expel her or him.333 Additional procedural 
protections include guarantees of individualized consideration of a 
migrant’s case, an opportunity to contest the reasons for expulsion, and the 
ability to seek review of any decision to expel.  
UN human rights treaty law provides specific due process guarantees 
that apply to expulsion procedures. For example, the ICCPR provides that 
non-citizens “lawfully in the territory of a State Party” may only be 
expelled for reasons established in the law, and that they must be 
permitted to present arguments against their expulsion before a competent 
authority.334 These procedural protections have arguably become part of 
general international law,335 but they do not extend to irregular migrants.  
For irregular migrants, the clearest protection appears to be the 
absolute prohibition on collective expulsions.336 While the ICCPR does 
not explicitly incorporate this protection, the HRC understands this 
 
 
332 Cámara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal 
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. 
EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. XII, 
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf.  
333 See Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al. v. United States, Case 12.562, Inter-Am.  
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 81/10, ¶¶ 61-65 (2010), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/merits.asp 
(finding independent violations of American Declaration Articles XVIII and XXVI, which include due 
process and fair trial guarantees).  
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protection to be implicit.337 Moreover, this prohibition is explicit in the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (“ICRMW”), which requires 
individualized consideration of all expulsions.338 Moreover, the ICRMW 
requires that expulsions only take place in pursuance of a decision by a 
competent authority in accordance with the law,339 that the decision is 
communicated in a language the non-citizen can understand and in writing 
if so requested,340 and that the non-citizen has the opportunity to submit 
the reasons he should not be expelled, and to seek a stay of expulsion, 
unless the decision is made by a judicial authority.341 
There are divergent opinions about the right to judicial review of an 
expulsion order under general international law. Prominent experts in 
migrant rights argue alternatively that all non-citizens have a right to 
judicial review, that only those who are lawfully present have such a right, 
or that none, lawfully present or otherwise, hold such a right.342 Of course, 
treaty law clarifies which of these positions prevails in certain contexts. In 
particular, the American Convention protects due process and judicial 
protection in its articles 8 and 25 respectively,343 and the Inter-American 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area suggests that the summary expulsion 
procedure under the DNU is deficient. 
The Inter-American Court, for example, has interpreted the right to a 
fair trial enshrined in the American Convention to guarantee the right to 
challenge an expulsion order before a court, as well as the right to a public 
hearing and to present a complete defense.344 The need for the full 
application of this right in the Argentine context in order to ensure respect 
for human rights is evident, particularly in light of the previous discussion 
on the rights to family unity and special protections for children. Indeed, 
the DNU has established that the DNM has exclusive authority to grant 
waivers of grounds of crime related inadmissibility and cancelation of 
 
 
337 General Comment No. 15, supra note 307, ¶ 10. 
338 G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 22(1) (Dec. 18, 1990).  
339 Id. art. 22(2). 
340 Id. art. 22(3). 
341 Id. art. 22(4). 
342 Chetail, supra note 304, at 56 (summarizing the positions of Guy Goodwin Gill, Maurice 
Kamto, and Richaerd Plender, respectively). 
343 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, arts. 8, 25.  
344 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 124-27 (Sept. 17, 2003); see also Vélez Loor v. Panama, infra 
note 351, ¶ 146; but cf. 90th  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, art. 14, ¶ 17, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
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residency.345 The practical result of this is that the violations of the right to 
family life and special protection for children that will systematically 
occur with the unavailability of a humanitarian waiver for persons with 
sentences that exceed three years will not be reviewed by courts. This was 
precisely the problem that the Inter-American Commission detected in 
Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et. al, when it found that the United 
States had not only violated the substantive rights of the petitioners, but 
had also violated their procedural rights by prohibiting U.S. courts from 
balancing the equities in the cases.346 
This problem was not specifically addressed in the decision of the trial 
court in the collective action litigation,347 but was denounced in the 
minority opinion of the appeals court Judge Alemany.348 This is another 
question that may be resolved by the Supreme Court, but must be 
challenged by individual non-citizens in expulsion proceedings while they 
await that opinion.  
In a broader sense, beyond this subject-matter limitation on the review 
of federal courts embedded in the law by the DNU, there is the question of 
whether the successive three-day deadlines violate due process protections 
under human rights law. The trial court determined that this issue was 
reviewable, and while the court upheld the summary expulsion procedure 
in that case,349 Judge Alemany of the appeals court found the three-day 
deadlines violated due process principles.350 
Due process standards under the American Convention support Judge 
Alemany’s conclusion. First, the right to due process has been extended to 
the administrative context, and to expulsion proceedings in particular.351 
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE 345  
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission has indicated that where 
fundamental rights are at stake in expulsion proceedings, the most 
expansive reading of due process rights is appropriate.352 
The Inter-American Commission requires that migrants have a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard, and present their defense when they 
face expulsion.353 This includes having adequate time to collect 
evidence,354 and the Commission has gone as far as to require that the 
State provide the opportunity for migrants to examine witness and present 
expert testimony to shed light on the circumstances relevant to their 
expulsion.355 Thus, the Commission has found that a State violates these 
obligations when it conducts expulsion proceedings in an unreasonably 
short period of time.356 
In the decision of the trial court upholding the three-day timeframes for 
the summary expulsion procedure established under the DNU, the court 
indicated that comparable procedures under Argentine law had similarly 
short timeframes. Without disputing this, the complexity of expulsion 
proceedings, that include reconstructing immigration histories, as well as 
the circumstances of underlying criminal convictions, and any mitigating 
factors, would certainly seem to require more than three days.  
The trial court did recognize a migrant’s right to counsel in finding that 
the government must notify the migrant of her right to an attorney at the 
expense of the State if she cannot afford one.357 Even if the three-day 
timeframe does not begin to run until the attorney enters an appearance, 
the notion that an attorney could adequately prepare a defense in the time 
provided defies all logic. The attorney would need to meet with the client 
to understand all the relevant details of the case, collect evidence, 
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including the testimony of any witnesses or experts, and present a well-
reasoned defense. Even if this was the only thing that an attorney did for 
three days, it would pose an insurmountable challenge. Moreover, 
expecting that an attorney would only work on that one case simply does 
not account for the realities of law practice, and cannot be sustained under 
the American Convention standards elaborated above.  
Judge Alemany from the appeals court expressed a particular concern 
with the three-day timeframe for administrative and judicial appeals, 
identifying jurisprudence from the Argentine Supreme Court that 
supported this conclusion.358 Moreover, individual challenges that 
highlight the inability of lawyers to adequately prepare a defense may 
succeed in raising the human rights problem represented by the three-day 
timeframes. Indeed, the jurisprudence presented in the first section of this 
Article suggests that untimely filings by counsel,359 as well an inability to 
contact the migrant, are bases to find a violation of the migrant’s right to 
counsel.360 As attorneys document their inability to adequately defend 
their clients through a procedure that is an ineffective means of vindicating 
migrants’ rights, courts should find that human rights require extensions of 
the timeframes provided by the summary expulsion procedure.  
Finally, the prohibition against arbitrary detention is a well-established 
principle of general international law codified in a broad range of treaties, 
and it has been applied fairly consistently to the context of immigration 
detention.361 For example, the ICCPR protects against arbitrary 
detention,362 and the HRC has interpreted that right as specifically 
extending to immigration detention.363 That said, detaining immigrants for 
purposes of immigration regulation and enforcement of immigration laws 
 
 
358 Cámara Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [National Court of Appeals in Federal 
and Administrative Litigation], sala V, 22/3/2018, “Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales y Otros c. 
EN-DNM / Amparo Ley 16.986 (expte. no. 3061/2017), voto Judge Jorge Federico Alemany, sec. XII, 
https://www.cels.org.ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fallo-camara-migrantes.pdf. 
359 See Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal [CNFed.] [Federal 
Court of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala V, 31/3/2016, “Diop Matar, Elhadji c. EN-M 
Interior – DNM / Recurso Directo DNM,” 3-4, 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/DM,%20E.pdf.  
360 Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal  [CNFed.] [Federal Court 
of Appeals in Administrative Litigation], sala I, 13/9/2016, “Chein Alvarado, Errol James c. EN-M 
Interior-DNM / recurso directo DNM,” 4, 
https://jurisprudencia.mpd.gov.ar/Jurisprudencia/CA,%20EJ.pdf. 
361 Chetail, supra note 304, at 50. 
362  CCPR, supra note 305, art. 9.1. 
363 16th UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 8: art. 9 (Right to Liberty 
and Security of Persons), ¶ 1(June 30, 1982). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE 347  
 
 
 
 
has not been found to be arbitrary per se.364 Indeed, the HRC recognized in 
an individual communication against Australia that there was no basis 
under international law to conclude that the detention of an entering 
asylum seeker was necessarily arbitrary.365 Three specific limitations do 
inform an inquiry into whether the detention of migrants is arbitrary: (1) 
whether it is authorized by the law; (2) whether the deprivation of liberty 
is reasonable, necessary and proportionate; and (3) whether there is a right 
to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in court.366 The Inter-
American Court for its part has required that a detained migrant be 
informed of the reasons for his detention and the nature of the proceedings 
being conducted against him.367 
In the early cases on the right to migrate, Argentine courts found that 
the detention of Chinese migrants prevented the State from meeting its 
obligations to facilitate the regularization of migrants and guarantee their 
access to counsel to formulate a defense.368 This early association between 
the freedom from detention and the ability to access a lawyer and build a 
defense has important human rights dimensions. Indeed, migrants continue 
to have a right to counsel and a right to regularize their status, which 
factors in to the determination whether detention would be “reasonable, 
necessary, and proportionate.” Indeed, while the above cited international 
human rights standards appear to permit the detention of irregular 
migrants in Australia, the same body of law likely mandates a different 
outcome in Argentina, where migrants continue to have a right to counsel 
and an opportunity to regularize their status.  
Human rights law provides a complete response to the DNU’s 
degradation of the right to family reunification, summary expulsion 
procedure, and increased reliance on detention. Argentina’s human rights 
obligations require robust timeframes for expulsion proceedings to protect 
the right to counsel, and the right to mount a defense. Moreover, the 
expulsion procedure must permit full consideration of requests to reside in 
Argentina to permit family reunification, which is guaranteed by both the 
immigrant bill of rights and human rights law. The DNU has certainly 
degraded the right to migrate in Argentina, but human rights law provides 
a means to defend its essence. 
 
 
364 Chetail, supra note 304, at 50. 
365 UN Human Rights Committee, A. v. Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997). 
366 Chetail, supra note 304, at 51–52. 
367 See Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, ¶ 109 (Nov. 23, 2010).  
368 See, e.g., Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Paraná [CFed.], 11/6/2011, “HC deducido por 
Dai Jianqing, Lin Xuehui, Xie Chenguang y Zhuang Bisheng,” Causa No. 5-17.559-20.768/2011.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:293 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The timing of President Macri’s restrictionist DNU, just days after 
President Trump issued his 2017 executive orders on immigration, 
suggests some relationship between national trends of criminalization of 
migrants and securitization of borders in the region. However, there are 
some key differences between the Argentine legal system and the U.S. 
legal system that will likely prevent Argentina from backsliding into the 
same troubling patters of U.S. immigration enforcement that have been the 
subject of rebuke for decades. Most notably, Macri’s DNU did not touch 
the immigrant bill of rights promulgated as part of the 2004 Law. This 
means that a right to migrate persists under Argentine law, and 
international human rights law continues to be directly embedded in that 
concept through the 2004 Law and the Argentine Constitution. 
The right to migrate represented a paradigm shift in how Argentina 
managed migrant flows, ensuring that all irregular migrants got the 
opportunity to regularize their status, free from detention, and with the 
assistance of counsel provided by the State. Macri’s DNU would have 
Argentina shift back to a system that relies on the broad discretion of 
immigration officials, makes expulsion the default for irregular migrants 
and those who have committed crimes, and increases the likelihood of 
detention. These steps strike at the heart of what the right to migrate has 
come to signify, but the persistence of that right in the body of the law 
should be understood as a counter measure to defend the core content of 
that right. In this regard, international human rights law could provide the 
framework to resist this incursion into the right to migrate. 
The right to family reunification is central to the 2004 Law, and human 
rights law helps to define the content of that right in a way that is 
meaningful in Argentina. The right to family life of persons in Argentina 
means that they should be able to reunite with family members living 
abroad and stay with their family members in Argentina, even when they 
have violated criminal laws. Immigration procedures and recourse to 
judicial protection should assist Argentines and immigrants alike in 
vindicating this and other important substantive rights, and to the extent 
that they do not, human rights law requires their amendment. If Argentina 
restores procedural fairness and provides immigrants with sufficient time 
to secure counsel and articulate a defense, including the right to family 
reunification, it will have retained the spirit of the right to migrate. 
There is much work to do in Argentina to address the harm wrought by 
President Macri’s campaign to disparage immigrants, who have been 
unfairly cast as criminals who threaten national security. Important aspects 
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of the process of societal healing is the defense of the fundamental rights 
of those immigrants whose place in Argentina society has been drawn into 
question and the reassertion of the right to migrate. 
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